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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation which consists of three essays investigates the influence of 
subjective probabilities on decision making processes under conditions of risk. In 
particular, it examines whether subjects adjust new risk information on their prior 
subjective estimates, and, to what extent this adjustment affects their choices.  
In the first essay, by using an artefactual field experiment, I examine the potential 
correlation between incentive compatibility and validity of subjective probabilities 
elicited via the Exchangeability Method, an innovative elicitation mechanism which 
consists of several chained questions. Here, validity is investigated using de Finetti’s 
notion of coherence under which subjective probabilities are coherent if and only if they 
obey all axioms and theorems of probability theory. Experimental results suggest that 
subjects provided with monetary incentives and randomized questions more likely 
express valid subjective probabilities than others because they are not aware of the 
chaining which undermines the incentive compatibility of the Exchangeability Method.  
In the second essay, by using the same experimental data, I show that valid 
subjective probabilities do not significantly diverge from invalid ones, indicative of 
little effect of internal validity on the actual magnitude of subjective probabilities.  
In the third essay, by using a field Choice Experiment, I investigate to what extent 
subjects adjust risk information given in the status quo alternative on their subjective 
probability estimates. An innovative two-stage approach that incorporates subjective 
probabilities into Choice Experiments’ design is developed to investigate this 
phenomenon, known as the scenario adjustment. In the first stage, subjective 
probabilities that given outcomes will occur are elicited using the Exchangeability 
Method. In the second stage, two treatment groups are designed: in the first group, each 
subject is presented with a status quo alternative which incorporates her/his subjective 
probabilities, and, hence, no adjustment is required; in the second group, each subject 
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faces a status quo alternative where the presented risk is not consistent with her/his 
probability estimates, and, hence, a mental adjustment to the scenario might take place. 
By comparing willingness to pay across the treatment groups, my results suggest that, 
when subjects are provided with SQ alternatives in which the risk is lower than the 
perceived one, the mental adjustment takes place, but, when subjects are provided with 
SQ alternatives in which the risk is higher than their own estimates, these subjects 
appear to make irrational choices. 
 
Keywords: subjective probability; discrete choice modeling; exchangeability method; 
choice experiment; apple; pesticide. 
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CHAPTER I . INTRODUCTION 
As many everyday choices involve future events that are surrounded by 
uncertainty, subjective probabilities strongly influence decision making processes 
(Manski, 2004). For example, households’ probability estimates of future income have 
been shown to affect consumption and saving decisions, while students’ probability 
estimates of returns to education to impact schooling choices (see Manski, 2004, for a 
review). Outside of the financial domain, subjective probabilities of future health 
outcomes have been demonstrated to affect the support for policies reducing mortality 
risk (Cameron et al., 2010), or consumption of food and bottled water (e.g., Viscusi and 
Evans, 1993; Williams and Hammit, 2001; Jakus et al., 2009; Shaw et al., 2012).  
My dissertation which is presented in the form of three essays investigates the 
influence that subjective probabilities of having contaminated apples have on subjects’ 
preferences for R&D programs that are geared to control the future spread of new apple 
diseases in the Province of Trento in Italy. More specifically, here, I explore strengths 
and limitations of a novel technique to elicit subjective probabilities, the 
Exchangeability Method (EM), and, more important, I develop an innovative approach 
which incorporates subjective probabilities into the design of choice experiments (CE). 
In the first essay, by using an artefactual field experiment, I investigate subjective 
probabilities of having contaminated apples elicited via the EM (Baillon, 2008, 
Abdellaoui et al., 2011). Specifically, I explore whether incentive compatibility affects 
the validity of subjective probabilities elicited using this innovative technique which 
consists of several chained questions. As chained elicitation mechanism are not 
necessarily incentive compatible, four experimental designs which aim to enhance the 
EM’s incentive compatibility are created. Afterwards, the validity of subjective 
probabilities elicited using each experimental design is investigated using de Finetti’s 
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notion of coherence, under which probability estimates are valid if and only if they obey 
all axioms of probability theory (de Finetti, 1937).  
In the second essays, by drawing on the experimental investigation presented 
above, the potential discrepancy between valid and invalid subjective probabilities is 
examined to fully understand whether failure to recognize validity implies an over- or 
underestimation of consumers’ probability estimates. Furthermore, a simple behavioral 
model is estimated to identify attitudinal and socio-economic factors that affect 
consumers’ subjective probabilities that apples will contain pesticide residues.  
In the third essay, by using a CE field survey, I investigate the influence that 
subjective probabilities of having contaminated apples have on preferences for 
alternative R&D programs that plan to control new apple diseases in the Province of 
Trento. Although subjects’ are commonly pretended to fully accept the risk information 
provided by researchers in the status quo (SQ) alternative, here, I hypothesize that 
subjects adjust this information on their subjective probability estimates. This 
phenomenon, called scenario adjustment, might generate confounding factors that 
researchers cannot capture in their choice models, and, therefore, compromise the 
accuracy of willingness-to-pay (WTP) estimates (Cameron et al., 2010).  
Here, the extent of this phenomenon and its impact on choice-behavior are 
investigated by using an innovative two-stage approach which compares WTP estimates 
elicited from subjects who might adjust the risk information given in the SQ on their 
subjective probabilities with WTP estimates of subjects who might not. In the first 
stage, subjective probabilities that given numbers of apples will contain pesticide 
residues are elicited by using the EM. In the second stage, WTP estimates for alternative 
R&D programs are elicited from subjects who belong to different treatment groups. In 
one treatment, each subject is presented with a SQ’ risk level which differs from her/his 
subjective estimates. In the other treatment, each subject faces an individual-specific SQ 
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in which the risk level is equal to her/his probability estimate. Subjective probabilities 
are incorporated into my CE by using a best-worst pivot experimental design. Pivot CE 
were developed in transport economics to generate SQ alternatives based on each 
subject’s most recent driving experience (e.g., Hensher and Greene, 2003, Hensher et 
al., 2009), however, this investigation is the first attempt to use this technique for 
designing subject-specific SQ alternatives tailored on subjective probability estimates.   
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CHAPTER II. ELICITING AND ESTIMATING VALID SUBJECTIVE 
PROBABILITIES: AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF THE 
EXCHANGEABILITY METHOD 
 
Introduction 
During the last two decades, many social scientists have become more interested 
in investigating and eliciting subjective probabilities of everyday events. The main 
reason to pursue this line of inquiry is because many choices in the real world involve 
future outcomes and take place under uncertainty. Hence, people often behave and make 
decisions according to their beliefs and expectations. Manski (2004) demonstrates the 
importance of subjective probabilities in several branches of applied economics, ranging 
from the influence of households’ probabilistic income expectations on their 
consumption and saving decisions, to the impact of  students’ probabilistic expectations 
of the returns (again, in income terms) to education on schooling choices.  
Expectations on risky and uncertain outcomes, which lie outside of the financial 
domain, are potentially complex, but also important to deal with. These have been 
neglected in economics until quite recently, perhaps, because they pertain to issues 
which are more difficult to address than financial risk and uncertainty, such as stock 
market activity. Early work on subjective probability pertained to another issue that is 
relatively simple to understand and for which outcomes are readily observable with 
short delays: the weather, specifically, temperature and precipitation forecasts (e.g., 
Brier, 1950; Baillon, 2008).  
A domain where subjective probabilities have been recognized to be crucial in 
understanding and predict people’s choice behavior is food safety, but little in this area 
has been done to explore subjective probability elicitation. Despite many studies have 
shown how consumers’ probabilistic expectations of food safety might affect purchases 
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(e.g., Buzby et al., 1998; Williams and Hammit, 2001), they often use very simple and 
rough methods for eliciting subjective probabilities, which often consist in directly 
asking subjects a guess of the probability that given outcomes will occur in the future. 
The key problem with issues such as food safety is that the nature of the uncertainty is 
less accessible to laypeople, and the primary outcome, the health effect, may be 
unobservable for quite some time to come1. However, a recent study suggests that 
uncertainty in food safety decisions may be quite important (Kivi and Shogren, 2010). 
In this essay, I investigate and elicit consumers’ perceptions of the probability that 
given levels of pesticide residues will be present in apples produced in the future in the 
Province of Trento (Italy). Pesticide residues pose health risks to people who eat apples, 
and, thus, people’s perceptions of their presence can affect their preferences for 
agricultural policies that local authorities are planning to incentivize the production of 
healthy apples. The investigation of this topic might be very important to this region as 
apple production is a key sector of its economy (P.A.T., 2010). Generally, the presence 
of pesticides in food is quite important, as we all must eat; several studies have shown 
that human exposures to chemicals are associated with risks to human health, they may 
even produce very severe illnesses as cancer (Alavanja et al., 2004).  
There are many different ways to elicit subjective probabilities and several are 
briefly discussed below. I use an innovative technique for eliciting probabilities, known 
as the Exchangeability Method (EM), recently used by Baillon (2008). He elicited 
subjective probabilities for future daily temperature in Paris, the euro/dollar exchange 
rate, and the daily variation of the French stock index CAC 40. His experimental 
subjects were asked to estimate these for a given day about four weeks after the 
experiment was conducted. The same technique was further developed by Abdellaoui et 
                                                          
1
 Short-term food sickness is perhaps observable after a short delay, but ethics in experiments preclude 
subjecting subjects to this. 
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al. (2011) to elicit subjective probabilities and investigate ambiguity attitudes related to 
similar topics2. 
 The EM consists of a set of binary questions where subjects are asked to bet a 
certain amount of money on a given outcome rather than on an alternative outcome. In 
each question, the outcomes which are presented to the subject result from a bisection 
procedure of the whole state space of the random variable under study. When subjects 
become indifferent between the two outcomes, they are assumed to perceive both as 
equally likely and subjective probabilities can be estimated. The sequential splitting 
process behind the EM makes this elicitation procedure chained, in the sense that the 
outcomes presented in each question depends on the outcome that has been chosen in 
the previous one.  
The incentive compatibility of the EM might be questioned because previous 
experimental studies have shown that chained elicitation mechanisms are not 
necessarily incentive compatible. In fact, the provision of monetary incentives to 
subjects, based on their choice behavior during the experiment, might induce them to 
not state their real beliefs, but, instead, to strategically behave to be better rewarded 
upon completion of the tasks for the experiment (e.g., Harrison, 1986).  
In this essay, I investigate whether the lack of incentive compatibility of the EM 
due to both the presence of chained questions and no provision of real monetary 
incentives, affects the validity of subjective probabilities elicited by such a technique. I 
determine and measure the validity of subjective probabilities elicited via the EM 
implementing a method based on de Finetti’s notion of coherence (1937). By using this 
                                                          
2
 They elicited subjective probabilities related to the daily variation of the French stock index CAC 40, 
temperature in Paris and also in a randomly drawn remote country for a given day about 3 months after 
the experiment. 
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approach I essentially aim to identify the best way for eliciting subjective probabilities 
via the EM, in terms of validity3.  
The remainder of the essay is laid out as follows. I first highlight the main 
strengths and limitations of the EM by comparing it to other techniques for eliciting 
beliefs. Next, I describe my testable hypotheses and the methodology used to measure 
validity of subjective probabilities. Finally, I offer some conclusions based on the 
experimental results I have obtained.  
 
Methods for eliciting subjective probabilities 
The simplest way to elicit subjective probabilities consists of asking people to 
directly state the chance that a specific magnitude of the outcome will happen in the 
future (Spetzler and Stael Von Holstein, 1975). Asking simple, direct questions is 
common in  a host of previous health-risk studies, such as those involving smoking 
cigarettes (e.g., Viscusi, 1990; Gerking and Khaddaria, 2011), drinking contaminated 
water (e.g., Jakus et al. 2009; Shaw et al., 2012), or eating unhealthy food (e.g., Buzby 
et al., 1998; Williams and Hammit, 2001).  
However, unless subjects are asked to state a chance for each of all possible 
specific magnitudes of outcomes, the information gathered from such an easy question 
is very limited. Using a direct approach like this, I might learn about only one point, or 
about a very narrow range, in the individual’s subjective probability distribution. 
The reliability of subjective probabilities elicited via this family of techniques, 
called direct methods, have also been often questioned, particularly by psychologists, on 
the grounds that laypeople may be neither familiar with the notion of probability per se, 
                                                          
3
 Since this experiment is conducted in the lab, with a controlled environment and real monetary 
incentives, we only refer to the internal validity of elicited risk estimates. Hence, I cannot analyze the 
external validity of my results, being aware that elicited estimates in the lab might be different from those 
elicited in the field, where it is impossible to control for many confounding factors (for instance, 
background risk) (Harrison et al., 2007).   
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nor willing to put efforts into thinking in probabilistic terms (Manski, 2004)4. Some 
have gone as far to suggest that individuals do better in understanding risks with verbal, 
rather than numerical percentage or probability scales (see discussion in Weinstein and 
Diefenbach, 1997). Several economic studies provide supporting evidence that people 
have problems with open-ended questions about probability estimates (e.g., Jakus et al., 
2009; Riddel and Shaw, 2006) 
Other approaches, called indirect methods, may overcome some of the limitations 
that direct methods have. Here, probability measures are indirectly estimated at the 
points for which subjects show their indifference between choices involving lotteries or 
gambles. Indirect techniques have often been used for eliciting probabilities related to 
financial outcomes (e.g., Andersen et al., 2010; Offerman et al., 2009) because actual 
monetary payments for played-out bets make the elicitation mechanism incentive 
compatible and appear to be relatively easy for subjects to understand. Quite recently, a 
few scholars have used indirect methods to estimate subjective probabilities related to 
health and environmental outcomes (e.g., Fiore et al., 2009; Cerroni and Shaw, 2012). 
As noted in the introduction, the limited use of these indirect methods, for eliciting 
probabilities related to health and environmental outcomes, is due to the fact that very 
long term health and environmental outcomes cannot be played out at the end of 
experiments in the lab setting, thus again making incentive compatibility a potential 
issue. Fiore et al. (2009) and Cerroni and Shaw (2012) both rely on hypothetical 
portrayals of adverse forest impacts, and, in the former study, the authors explore the 
use of virtual forest fires in the experimental setting. 
The most popular of the indirect methods are called “external reference events”, 
in which subjects are asked to choose between a lottery characterized by an uncertain 
                                                          
4
 Many studies investigated different approaches for communicating probabilities to laypeople and, then, 
eliciting their best estimate (e.g., Gigerenzer and Hoffrage, 1995; Hammit and Graham, 1999; Corso et 
al., 2001). 
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event (U), whose probability needs to be estimated, and a lottery characterized by an 
external reference event (K), whose probability is known and disclosed to subjects. The 
probability of the known event (K) is often visually presented through probability 
wheels, scroll bars, or other visual aids such as risk ladders, grids, or pie charts, all of 
which have been tested as probability communication devices (e.g., Morgan and 
Henrion, 1990). Once subjects become indifferent between the two lotteries, the 
uncertain outcome (U) is assumed to have the same probability of occurrence of the 
familiar outcome (K), so that  P(U) = P(K) (Spetzler and Stael Von Holstein, 1975).  
Although these techniques are widely used, they may produce biased probability 
estimates because they ask subjects to process two sources of uncertainty at the same 
time: the first relates to the uncertain outcome (U), the second relates to the external 
reference event (K). Previous experimental studies have shown that individual choices 
depend on the source of uncertainty that subjects have been asked to consider5 (e.g., 
Kilka and Weber, 2001; Abdellaoui et al., 2011), and, hence, elicitation mechanisms, 
which combine diverse sources of uncertainty, may become too complex and generate 
biased subjective probabilities (Baillon, 2008). 
Source dependence does not appear to be an issue within another class of indirect 
methods which use internal events. In these elicitation techniques, subjects deal with 
magnitudes of the outcomes, but not with their probabilities of occurrence. In fact, 
subjects are only asked to bet a certain amount of money on one of the several disjoint 
subspaces, in which the whole state space of the variable under study has been 
previously divided. When subjects become indifferent regarding betting on one disjoint 
subspace rather than on the others, subjects are assumed to perceive those subspaces as 
equally likely (Spetzler and Stael Von Holstein, 1975).  
                                                          
5
 Baillon (2008, p.77) defined a source of uncertainty as “…a set of events that are generated by a 
common mechanism of uncertainty”.  
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The EM, which was first described by Raiffa (1968) and more recently 
implemented by Baillon (2008) and Abdellaoui et al. (2011), belongs to this latter class 
of probability elicitation techniques. In the specific case of the EM, each question gives 
subjects the chance to bet on one of two disjoint subspaces, as the whole state space of 
the random variable under study is sequentially divided using a bisection process. The 
subdividing procedure of the event space makes each binary question of the EM chained 
to the previous one. In fact, the sub-events that subjects face in each question depend on 
the sub-event that has been chosen in the precedent question.  
As noted in the introduction, chained techniques for eliciting preferences or 
beliefs are perhaps not incentive compatible. Strategic behaviors might have strong 
impacts on elicited subjective probabilities (Harrison, 1986) and chained questions may 
propagate subjects’ strategic choices made during the choice-tasks (e.g., Spetzler and 
Stael Von Holstein, 1975; Wakker and Deneffe, 1996). Previous investigations that rely 
on chained games and real monetary incentives have validated their results by using 
subjects’ statements of unawareness about the presence of chaining in the games (Van 
de Kuilen et al., 2006; Abdellaoui et al., 2011).  
Baillon (2008) dealt with this problem by randomizing the order of questions. The 
questions are not sequentially presented and, thus, the chaining is less transparent to 
subjects because they are no longer aware of the relationship between the disjoint 
subspaces they face in one question and the subspace they have chosen in the previous 
one.  Developing this experimental design with randomized questions, one hopes that 
telling the truth becomes the simplest and most efficient strategy that subjects can use 
when they play the EM (Baillon, 2008). 
The effect of real monetary incentives on the elicitation of subjective probabilities 
has been investigated in another recent application of the EM by Abdellaoui et al. 
(2011). After having tested that subjects were unaware of the chained structure of the 
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EM, they next compare subjective probabilities provided by two groups of subjects, one 
provided with monetary incentives and the other not. They did not find any substantial 
difference between subjective probabilities elicited from the two groups, but do not 
provide a logical explanation as to why subjects provided with money incentives should 
have greater or lower beliefs than others.6  
In contrast, I argue that monetary incentive may affect the validity of subjective 
probabilities elicited via the EM depending on whether subjects are aware of the 
chaining or not. In particular, I believe that monetary incentives and the ordering of 
questions may affect the incentive compatibility of the Exchangeability Method and, 
therefore, the validity of subjective probabilities elicited by using this technique. Here, I 
don’t want to confuse truth with validity, in fact, as reported below, incentive 
compatibility and validity are separate and distinct concepts. An elicitation mechanism 
is incentive compatible if subjects have an incentive to state their real beliefs (Vossler 
and Evans, 2009), while subjective probabilities are valid if and only if they obey all 
axioms and theorems of probability theory (de Finetti, 1937).  
In this essay, I hypothesize that subjective probabilities elicited via incentive 
incompatible mechanisms, which induce subjects to not truly state their beliefs, are 
likely to be invalid, in the sense that they do not obey to axioms and theory of 
probability theory.  
To test my predictions, I create a validation method based on the de Finetti’s 
notion of coherent probability measures (1937; 1974a; 1974b) under which subjective 
probabilities are coherent if and only if they obey all axioms and theorems of 
probability theory. The choice of using the de Finetti’s notion of coherence to define 
                                                          
6
 They found that probability distribution functions of median temperature in Paris in a given day for both 
groups are quite well calibrated with historical distribution of temperature in that particular day.  In 
contrast, they found that probability distribution functions of median daily variation of the French stock 
index CAC 40 in a given day for both groups differ from historical distribution of CAC 40 daily variation 
in that particular day. 
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valid subjective probabilities relies on the fact that the EM is based on the assumption 
of exchangeability-based probabilistic sophistication (Chew and Sagi, 2006). That, in 
turn, is based on the idea of equal likelihoods of exchangeable events (de Finetti, 1937)  
 
Specific Objectives  
Previous applications of the Exchangeability Method have not directly 
investigated the effect of chaining on subject’s choice-behaviors (see Baillon, 2008; 
Abdellaoui et al., 2011), but they have simply tried to avoid the use of the identifiable 
chained questions in their experimental designs. As noted before, this is due to the fact 
that previous experimental studies have shown how the provision of chained questions 
along with real monetary incentives make the elicitation mechanism incentive 
incompatible (Harrison, 1986).  
In line with the above discussion, I hypothesize that subjective probabilities 
elicited via an incentive incompatible mechanism more likely turn out to be invalid. In 
particular, I hypothesize that subjective probabilities elicited via the EM, using 
sequential questions along with real monetary incentives are invalid because, when the 
chaining is clear to subjects, monetary incentives will encourage them to strategically 
behave. In contrast, when random questions are provided in the EM along with 
monetary incentives, subjective probabilities are valid because when the chaining is less 
transparent to subjects, monetary incentives induce them to state their real beliefs, or at 
least, to invest more cognitive effort into the elicitation process7. 
I also hypothesize that subjects provided with random questions will perform 
better than those provided with sequential questions in terms of validity, even in the 
absence of actual monetary rewards at the end of the experiment. I expect those who are 
not aware of the chaining will provide invalid subjective probabilities, but less so than 
                                                          
7
 I thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this possibility. 
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those who are aware of the chaining structure. My prediction is supported by the fact 
that questions related to the elicitation of the third quartile ask subjects to choose 
between two prospects that they have already ruled out in previous questions. The issue 
is evident to subjects when questions are sequentially ordered, while it is less 
transparent when they are randomly ordered. This may affect the validity of 
probabilities elicited using sequential questions as subjects may perceive questions to be 
meaningless and may invest less cognitive effort in playing the game.  
To test my hypotheses, I first need to understand whether elicited subjective 
probabilities are valid or not. The empirical way I tested the validity of subjective 
probability elicited via the EM is described below. 
 
The Experimental Design 
The empirical application 
My specific application consists of investigating uncertain outcomes related to fire 
blight, a bacterial disease that has threatened apple orchards in the Province of Trento, 
at least since 2003 (EMF, 2006). This phytopathology damages and kills apple plants 
resulting in substantial losses in the production of apples. The best available science 
predicts a future spread of the disease in apple orchards of the Province of Trento, since 
suitable climatic conditions for the biology of the bacterium Erwinia amylovora are 
likely to occur in the future (unpublished results by Edmund Mach Foundation).  
Although Italian farmers currently control the fire blight by using pesticides, 
chemicals might be not efficient enough to prevent the future spread of this apple 
disease. Nevertheless, the future production of apples in the Province of Trento (around 
420.000 tons at the present time) might not decrease if farmers start implementing new 
adaptation strategies against fire blight. However, the only strategy that is currently 
available to farmers is the introduction of new active principles, such as the antibiotic 
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streptomycin that is currently forbidden by the Italian legislation, but that has been 
already used in U.S., Germany, Belgium and, Netherlands for controlling the fire blight 
(Németh, 2004).  
In the context presented here, I focus on three diverse random variables: the 
percentage (or number) of days in which the infestation will occur during the 
blossoming period in 2030 (g)8, the number of apples containing at least one residue in 
a sample of 100 apples in 2030 (a)9, and the number of apples containing more than 1 
residue in a sample of 100 apples in 2030 (r)10. These variables have been selected 
among many other possible measures of pest infestation, or apple contamination, after 
having interviewed approximately 20 focus group subjects. 
  
The Exchangeability Method and the related game 
Let a random variable under study in the EM game (EG) be g. The EG uses a 
series of binary questions to reveal an individual’s underlying cumulative distribution 
function (CDF) over an event x that is drawn from an event space, SG = 11G . The first 
step of the EG establishes the lower and upper bounds of the event space, defined as g0 
and g1. Each subject is asked the bounds for outcomes outside of which they are 
essentially certain the outcome cannot happen at all ― i.e., the bounds that pertain to a 
non-zero probability of an outcome.  
The second step of the EG involves asking a series of questions that establish the 
value of g1/2∈SG that corresponds with the 50th percentile of the subjective CDF, in 
other words, the median estimate. This series of questions asks the subject to choose 
between binary prospects. In the first binary question, SG is divided at a point ga into 
two prospects, say Ga={g0<x<ga} and Ga’={ga≤x<g1}, where ga={g0 + [(g1-g0)/2]}. If 
                                                          
8
 The blossoming period usually occurs in April in Trentino. 
9
 This is the number of apples at least one residue beyond the level of 0 mg/kg. 
10
 This is the number of apples containing at least two residues beyond the level of 0 mg/kg.
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Ga was chosen by the individual, the implication is that the individual believes the 
probability of occurrence of the sub-event Ga is equal to that of the sub-event Ga’, so 
that P(Ga)≥P(Ga’) and ga≥g1/2. A follow-up binary question is then asked of this same 
individual, using a new value gb and two new prospects Gb and Gb’. If Ga was chosen in 
the first question, then ga>gb. However, if Ga’ was chosen in the first question, then 
ga<gb. This process is repeated until the individual reaches a value gz such that she is 
indifferent between Gz and Gz’. When this point is reached, it follows that gz=g1/2, Gz=
1
2G , Gz’=
2
2G , and P(Gz)=P(Gz’). This process describes the “chaining” or 
interdependence of these binary outcome questions. 
A similar process can be followed to determine other points for the individual’s 
subjective CDF; in theory as many as the researcher wants to identify. However, there is 
a limit to how many separate points can be elicited because of potential exhaustion of 
the subject. For example, to determine the value of g1/4∈SG that corresponds with the 
25th percentile, a gamble is proposed that is contingent on a value of x that is lower than 
g1/2 obtained in the previous step. Once again, a sequence of values, ga, gb, …, gz is 
used, but in this next case (the quartile) the initial upper bound is g1/2. In the first new 
binary question, subjects choose between the following binary prospects, Ga={g0<x<ga} 
and  Ga’={k1≤x<g1/2}. As above, this process is repeated until the individual is 
indifferent between Gz and Gz’, so that gz=g1/4 Gz= 14G , Gz’=
2
4G , and P(Gz)=P(Gz’) (see 
Figure 2.1 and Appendix A). At the end of the EG, the second binary question that 
subjects have already answered is presented again to them in order to test the 
consistency of their choice behaviors. 
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Figure 2.1 Scheme of the Exchangeability Game’s bisection procedure 
 
 
Other games 
The Repeated Exchangeability Game (REG) consists in eliciting a new measure 
of the median value of individual CDFs, say g1/2’, through a second round of 
Exchangeability Game. This round differs from the first one because the lower and 
upper bounds of the event space are now not defined by g0 and g1, but instead by the 
subjective estimates of the quartiles g1/4 and g3/4 elicited via the Exchangeability Game 
(see Example 2 in Appendix A).  
The Certainty Equivalent Game (CEG) is based on the notion of certainty 
equivalents (CE), defined as the sure amount of money that makes subjects indifferent 
to gamble. For the CEG, the subjects are presented with two choice tasks, say CT1 and 
CT2, both containing six binary questions. In each question of the first choice task 
(CT1), the subject is asked to choose between a lottery (Lottery 1), in which he or she 
wins a monetary outcome x if the real outcome ijG  will happen in the future (or a null 
monetary outcome otherwise), and a sure payment z, varying from 0 to 100€. In the 
same way, in the CT2, subjects are asked to choose between a lottery (Lottery 2), in 
which they win a monetary outcome x if the real outcome kjG  will happen in the future 
(or a null monetary outcome otherwise), and a sure payment z varying from 0 to 100€. 
Hence, each subject is presented with two choice tasks characterized by six binary 
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matching question where he or she has to choose between options A (bet x € on the 
occurrence of ijG  in CT1 or 
k
jG  in CT2) and B (take the amount of money z = 0, 25, 49, 
51, 75, and 100€) (see Example 3 in Appendix A). The certainty equivalent for the 
lottery described in option A is determined by looking at the first question of the choice 
task in which the subject switches from choosing option A to choose option B. Recall 
that ijG  and 
k
jG  are the couple of sub-spaces that have been already judged to be 
equally likely by the subjects themselves, during the earlier Exchangeability Game. 
Each subject in my study was presented with this game three times for each variable of 
interest in the study. In the first, the two lotteries involved in the game are denoted as 
1
2G  and 
2
2G , in the second, they are 
1
4G  and 
2
4G , and in the third, they are 
3
4G  and 
4
4G 11. 
 
The sample 
The sample of laboratory subjects consists of 80 individuals who were randomly 
recruited outside the main supermarkets of Trento and asked to come in the 
experimental lab of the University of Trento for a compensation of 25€ (show-up fee). 
Given the fact that I recruit non-students and, then, I bring them in the lab, I can define 
my study as an artefactual field experiment (Harrison and List, 2004). My sample 
consists of people between 18 and 70 years age who live in the Province of Trento and 
the sample is balanced regarding the gender. They are not strictly speaking, a simple 
random sample of the population, because they were recruited outside food markets, but 
as most people visit such markets to obtain food, they probably are quite representative 
of people living in this Province. Moreover, the random nature of the sample may be 
biased by subjects’ motivation to participate in the experiment. For example, subjects 
                                                          
11
 Both games have been already used to test exchangeability in other experimental applications (e.g., 
Baillon, 2008; Abdellaoui et al., 2011). 
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may participate because they were interested in the topic or because they were in need 
of the show-up fee.  
 
Treatments 
Selected participants were randomly assigned to four subsamples or treatment 
groups, where each treatment is characterized by a different experimental design: “real 
incentives-random questions” (22 subjects)12, “real incentives-sequential questions” (23 
subjects), “hypothetical incentives-random questions” (19 subjects), and “hypothetical 
incentives-sequential questions” (16 subjects). For the “hypothetical incentives” 
treatments, subjects are only given a show-up fee, while in the “real incentives” 
treatments, subjects are told that one randomly selected individual from each group has 
the chance to win additional 100€ based on her/his choices during the experiment. 
Specifically, one subject is to be randomly selected at the end of the experiment and one 
of the questions she/he answers during the experiment is also randomly selected to be 
played out. The lucky subject is selected through the draw of a numbered chip from a 
bingo cage (Cage 1). The total number of chips is equal to the total number of 
participants in each session, so that each subject has an equal chance of being selected. 
The question with the potential pay-out is also selected through the draw of a numbered 
chip from another bingo cage (Cage 2), that contains as many numbered chips as the 
number of questions that the subject answered during the experiment. The drawn 
participant wins the additional 100€ if and only if the event she/he had chosen in the 
drawn question contains the value of the random variable under consideration that the 
best science currently predicts. This prediction is based on the research conducted by 
                                                          
12
 The original “real incentives-random questions” treatment had 23 subjects, however I deleted 
observations gathered from one particular subject who declared that she has made a mistake during the 
tasks.  Given that subjects did not have the chance to correct their errors during the experiment and 
chained experimental designs propagate mistakes, my subjects were asked to declare if they 
unintentionally made errors answering experimental questions.  
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the Edmund Mach Foundation (EMF). This procedure for the determination of a “win” 
in the lottery situation is similar to that used by Fiore et al. (2009) in their virtual 
experiment on the risk of wild fires. Despite some participants already being aware of 
the existence of the EMF, all subjects are provided with general information about the 
EMF’s research that provides science-based estimate of probabilities. Note that even 
when all subjects receive the same information, it is a common finding that they may 
not form the same subjective estimates (e.g. Riddel and Shaw, 2006; Shaw et al., 2012). 
In all treatments subjects were provided with precise information about the values that 
the random variables under study had in the last ten years (from 2000 to 2010) and, 
then, they were asked to play the games.  
In the “sequential questions” treatments subjects are asked to answer questions 
that allow us to elicit the percentiles of their CDFs in the following order: g1/2, g1/4, g3/4, 
a1/2, a1/4, a3/4, r1/2, r1/4, and r3/4. In the “random questions” treatments this chained 
structure of the game is hidden through a mixed up order of questions determined once 
and for all. In fact, I elicit the percentiles of subjects’ CDFs in the following order: g1/2, 
a1/2, r1/2, g1/4, a1/4, r1/4, g3/4, a3/4, and  r3/4. 
It follows that each subject, regardless of the treatment group to which she/he is 
randomly assigned, plays the Exchangeability and the other games three times, one for 
each random variable under study.  
 
Hypotheses about the validity of subjective probabilities 
To investigate the effect of sequential (or random questions) and real (or 
hypothetical) monetary incentives on the validity of subjective probabilities elicited via 
the Exchangeability Game, I first need to understand whether gathered estimates are 
valid or not. Given the theoretical background of the EG, I argue that subjective 
probabilities elicited via this technique are valid if the only if the exchangeability 
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assumption is satisfied. Otherwise they are invalid. In fact, under the exchangeability 
assumption, subjective probabilities elicited via the EG satisfy all definitions, axioms 
and theorems of probability theory. Considering two disjoint sub-events, ijG  and kjG , 
the exchangeability assumption is satisfied when the two sub-events are exchangeable, 
in the sense that the probability related to the occurrence of one must be equal to the 
probability of occurrence of the other (see Appendix B). When the assumption holds I 
fail to reject the following null hypothesis (H0) and I consider elicited subjective 
probabilities valid: 
 
H0: ( ) ( ) nkikGPGP kjij ≤≠∀= ,,  
H1: ( ) ( ) nkikGPGP kjij ≤≠≠ ,,  
 
I test this hypothesis and, thus, the validity of subjective probabilities elicited via 
the EM by investigating whether subjects’ choice behaviors are consistent across the 
Exchangeability Game, the Repeated Exchangeability Game, and the Certainty 
Equivalent Game. In particular, I test the following two hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1. I test whether the exchangeability assumption is satisfied or not by 
comparing the estimates of g1/2 obtained from the Exchangeability Game and the 
estimates of g1/2’ obtained from Repeated Exchangeability Game. The exchangeability 
assumption is satisfied, and, thus, the subjective probability of the event g1/2  is valid, if 
and only if I fail to reject the following null hypothesis (H0): 
 
H0: g1/2  = g1/2’ 
H1: g1/2 ≠ g1/2’ 
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Hypothesis 2. I test whether the exchangeability assumption is satisfied or not by 
comparing the certainty equivalents that subjects are willing to accept to give up the 
possibility to play the lotteries presented in the matched pairs of choice tasks, ( )[ ]ijGxL :  
in CT1 and ( )[ ]kjGxL :  in CT2 (Certainty Equivalent Game). The exchangeability 
assumption is satisfied, and, thus, the subjective probability of the event presented in 
both CT1 and CT2
  
is valid,  if and only if I fail to reject the following null hypothesis 
(H0): 
 
H0: ( )[ ] ( )[ ]kjij GxLCEGxLCE :: = , with k ≠ i, k ≤ j 
H1: ( )[ ] ( )[ ]kjij GxLCEGxLCE :: ≠  
 
Testing hypotheses 
Before testing the hypotheses above, I first check the consistency of subjects’ 
choice behaviors by examining their answers to the repeated binary questions presented 
at the end of the Exchangeability Game. In the 66.51% of cases, subjects’ choices are 
the same in the original and repeated questions. This result is quite encouraging, given 
that Baillon (2008) found a consistency rate of 70.51% applying the same procedure to 
evaluate consistency, but investigating random variables more familiar to subjects than 
the ones I have examined here. Further, the McNemar test shows that subjects’ choices 
are consistent even across treatments (Table 2.1).  
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Table 2.1 McNemar’s test of consistency 
Treatment Null Hypothesis χ2 
Real incentives-
Sequential questions 
P(AB)a = P(BA)b 1.60 
Real incentives- 
Random questions 
P(AB) = P(BA) 0.31 
Hypothetical incentives- 
Sequential questions 
P(AB) = P(BA) 0.82 
Hypothetical incentives-
Random questions 
P(AB) = P(BA) 1.32 
a
 P(AB) is the probability of choosing prospect A in the original question 
and prospect B in the repeated question. 
b
 P(BA) is the probability of choosing prospect B in the original question 
and prospect A in the repeated question. 
*1% significance level, **5% significance level, ***10% significant 
level 
 
Next, testing my hypotheses at sample level, I determine whether subjects, 
belonging to diverse experimental treatments, provide valid subjective probabilities or 
not. This allows us to test predictions presented above, in particular, the fact that 
subjects provided with real monetary incentives and random questions state valid 
subjective probabilities, while the others do not. Recall that subjects are assumed to 
provide valid subjective probabilities if the exchangeability assumption holds and, thus, 
if and only if I fail to reject the null hypotheses presented in Hypotheses 1 and 2.  
I test Hypotheses 1 and 2 by using non-parametric tests such as the Wilcoxon 
Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks test (WMP) and the Sign Test of Matched Pairs (SMP)
.
 
The SMP test is used because the assumptions behind the WMP test were not always 
satisfied in my sample. For example, the differences between the matched values 
provided by each subject were not always distributed symmetrically around the median 
point in my sub-samples (symmetry assumption).  
While testing Hypothesis 1, I only investigate the validity of individual CDFs’ 
medians (g1/2, a1/2, and r1/2), as I rely on estimates elicited via the Exchangeability Game 
and Repeated Exchangeability Game, testing Hypothesis 2, I also examine the validity 
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of individual CDFs’ first and third quartiles (g1/2, a1/2, r1/2, g1/4, a1/4, r1/4, g3/4,  a3/4,and  
r3/4), as I rely on estimates elicited via the Exchangeability Game and Certainty 
Equivalent Game.   
Further, I assess the validity rate (V) for each different experimental treatment, 
which is the percentage of valid subjective probabilities out of the total number of 
elicited estimates in each treatment. This rate allows us to quantitatively assess the 
validity of subjective probabilities for each treatment and test, once more, predictions 
presented in Paragraph 3. To compute validity rates, I first need to verify whether each 
observation (g1/2, a1/2, r1/2, g1/4, a1/4, r1/4, g3/4,  a3/4, and  r3/4) provided by each subject (i 
= 1,...,80) is valid or not. For example, let’s consider one specific experimental subject, 
who provides us with the estimate of g1/2, I assume that this estimate is valid if and only 
if the certainty equivalents for Lottery 1 and 2, presented in the Certainty Equivalent 
Game, are equal, thus, ( )[ ] ( )[ ]2212 :: GxLCEGxLCE = . This does not imply any statistical 
test, but just a simple check of the equality between ( )[ ]12: GxLCE  and ( )[ ]22: GxLCE . 
In addition, by examining the dissimilarity between ( )[ ]12: GxLCE  and 
( )[ ]22: GxLCE , I can also investigate how much elicited subjective probabilities are 
invalid. For each elicited probability, the dissimilarity is measured as the absolute value 
of the difference between the certainty equivalents for Lottery 1 and Lottery 2 that is 
given by ∆   ( )[ ]12: GxLCE  ( )[ ]22:GxLCE . 
Based on these absolute values, I create an invalidity scale consisting of five 
categorical level of invalidity: very low invalidity when ( ) { }27<∈∆ xCE , low 
invalidity when ( ) { }5227 <≤∈∆ xCE , medium invalidity when ( ) { }7752 <≤∈∆ xCE , 
high invalidity when ( ) { }10177 <≤∈∆ xCE , and, finally, very high invalidity when 
( ) { }101≥∈∆ xCE . These boundaries have been chosen as the absolute values, ∆(CE), 
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are naturally grouped in five categories given the range of the sure amount of money x 
that subjects might accept instead of playing the lotteries presented in the Certainty 
Equivalent Game.   
Using this classification, I calculate the percentage of invalid probability estimates 
that falls within each category of invalidity and, hence, I investigate how far off invalid 
probabilities are from being valid.  
Finally, I hypothesize that, not only the features of the experimental setting may 
determine the validity of subjects’ subjective probabilities, but also their socio-
economic conditions. I econometrically test this hypothesis by estimating a model in 
which the discrete dependent variable captures the validity of each observation provided 
by each subject, while independent variables capture the characteristics of each 
experimental setting and other socio-economic variables which characterize subjects, 
allowing for some observable heterogeneity.  
 
Results 
Non-parametric tests 
By testing Hypothesis 1 for each experimental group of subjects, I identify the 
effect of my experimental designs on subjects’ capability to provide valid estimates of 
the median values. In the “real incentives-sequential questions” treatment I have 24 
matched pairs of observations, in the “real incentives-random questions” 40, in the 
“hypothetical incentives-sequential questions”  22, and in the “hypothetical incentives-
random questions” 26 (Table 2.2).  
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Table 2.2 Summary statistics of median values obtained via EG (X1/2)  and REG (X1/2’) 
Treatment Variable Obs Mean St.Dev. Min Max 
Real incentives- 
Sequential questions 
X1/2 24 44.37 27.69 7 94 
 X1/2’ 24 44.96 27.87 7 94 
Real incentives- 
Random questions 
X1/2 40 44.05 26.17 2 96 
 X1/2’ 40 44.17 25.98 3 96 
Hypothetical incentives- 
Sequential questions 
X1/2 22 54.91 28.03 5 94 
 X1/2’ 22 55.91 28.08 7 94 
Hypothetical incentives- 
Random questions 
X1/2 26 40.35 28.74 3 94 
 X1/2’ 26 40.65 28.27 3 96 
 
 
The validity of individual CDFs’ medians (g1/2, a1/2, and r1/2) is determined by 
testing Hypothesis 1 via both the Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks (WMP) and 
the Sign Test of Matched Pairs tests (SMP). Median estimates are assumed to be valid if 
and only if I fail to reject the null hypothesis characterizing this test. The WMP test’ 
results suggest that “real incentives-random questions” and “hypothetical incentives-
random questions” treatments provide valid estimates, while “real incentives-sequential 
questions” and “hypothetical incentives-sequential question” treatments do not. The 
SMP test almost produces the same results, except for the fact that also “hypothetical 
incentives-sequential question” treatment provides valid estimates (Table 2.3).  
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Table 2.3 Results at sample level obtained via EG (X1/2)  and REG (X1/2’) 
 Wilcoxon 
matched-pairs 
signed ranks test 
Binomial 
sign test 
Treatment Null Hypothesis Z P>Z 
Real incentives- 
Sequential questions 
Median(X1/2) =Median(X1/2’) -2.234** 0.062 
Real incentives- 
Random questions 
Median(X1/2) =Median(X1/2’) -0.665 0.480 
Hypothetical incentives- 
Sequential questions 
Median(X1/2) =  Median(X1/2’) -1.880*** 0.125 
Hypothetical incentives-
Random questions 
Median(X1/2) =  Median(X1/2’) -1.174 0.266 
*1% significance level; **5% significance level; ***10% significant level 
 
The discrepancy between WMP and SMP’s results about the “hypothetical 
incentives-sequential question” treatment suggests that the interpretation of these results 
is problematic, and thus, I conclude that only “real incentives-random questions” and 
“hypothetical incentives-random questions”  treatments provide valid subjective 
estimates. 
Testing Hypothesis 2 for each experimental group of subjects allows us to 
investigate whether subjects, belonging to diverse experimental treatments, provide 
valid estimates of the median, first quartile, and third quartile values of individual CDFs 
or not. In the “real incentives-sequential questions” treatment I have 143 matched pairs 
of observations, in the “real incentives-random questions” 167, in the “hypothetical 
incentives-sequential questions” 136, and in the “hypothetical incentives-random 
questions” 115 (Table 2.4).  
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Table 2.4 Summary statistics of the Certainty Equivalents obtained via CEG 
Treatment Variable Obs Mean St.Dev. Min Max 
Real incentives- 
Sequential questions 
CEL1 143 51.21 46.38 0 125 
CEL2 143 76.95 44.69 0 125 
Real incentives- 
Random questions 
CEL1 167 59.80 42.31 0 125 
CEL2 167 68.22 41.72 0 125 
Hypothetical incentives- 
Sequential questions 
CEL1 136 70.80 43.30 0 125 
CEL2 136 75.86 42.14 0 125 
Hypothetical incentives- 
Random questions 
CEL1 115 55.65 36.14 0 125 
CEL1 115 73.17 37.11 0 125 
 
 
Again, the validity of median, first quartile, and third quartile estimates of 
individual CDFs (g1/2, a1/2, r1/2, g1/4, a1/4, r1/4, g3/4,  a3/4, and  r3/4) is determined by testing 
Hypothesis 2 via both the WMP and the SMP tests. Estimates are assumed to be valid if 
and only if I fail to reject the null hypothesis characterizing this test. The WMP test’s 
results show that the “real incentives-sequential questions” treatment and the 
“hypothetical incentives-random questions” treatments do not provide valid estimates, 
while the “real incentives-random questions” and the “hypothetical incentives-
sequential questions” treatments do. However, the validity of WMP test’s results about 
the “hypothetical incentives-sequential question” treatment may be compromised 
because all assumptions behind the test are not completely satisfied. As the SMP test’s 
results suggest that also the “hypothetical incentives-sequential questions” treatment 
does not provide valid estimates, I conclude that the “real incentives-random questions” 
is the only treatment providing valid estimates (Table 2.5).  
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Table 2.5 Results at sample level obtained via the CEG  
 Wilcoxon 
matched-pairs 
signed ranks test 
Binomial 
sign test 
Treatment Null Hypothesis Z P>Z 
Real incentives- 
Sequential questions 
Median(CEL1) = Median(CEL2) -3.713* 0.002 
Real incentives- 
Random questions 
Median(CEL1) = Median(CEL2) -1.513 0.304 
Hypothetical incentives- 
Sequential questions 
Median(CEL1) = Median(CEL2) -1.283 0.088 
Hypothetical incentives-
Random questions 
Median(CEL1) = Median(CEL2) -3.005* 0.000 
*1% significance level, **5% significance level, ***10% significant level 
 
Considering the whole set of subjective estimates, and not just median estimates, 
my results support the hypothesis, under which only subjects provided with real 
monetary incentives along with random questions return valid subjective probabilities. 
This result demonstrates that when the chaining structure of the elicitation mechanism is 
not perceived by experimental subjects, monetary incentives increase the chance of 
eliciting valid subjective estimates. However, it does not prove that validity depends on 
whether subjects perceive the Exchangeability Game to be incentive compatible or not. 
 Above, I predicted that subjects who perceived the EM to not be incentive 
compatible strategically play the game and provide invalid subjective probabilities. My 
prediction is supported if the percentage of rewarded subjects is higher in experimental 
treatments where real incentives are associated with sequential questions rather than 
with random questions. This is due to the fact that subjects who face sequential 
questions, perceive the chaining and, thus, strategically play (or, at least try to) the 
incentive incompatible elicitation mechanism to get better rewarded at the end of the 
experiment. I test this hypothesis by taking into account the subjects who belong to real 
incentive treatments, and simulating the rewards that each subject should have gained if 
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she/he was the randomly drawn subjects and the third question he/she answered was the 
randomly drawn question13. 
I found that the chance of being rewarded is 50 percent for subjects playing 
sequential questions and 34.78 percent for those playing random questions (Table 2.6). 
This finding supports the hypothesis that subjects who are aware of the chaining play 
the elicitation mechanism to get better rewarded, but, unfortunately, also provide invalid 
subjective probabilities. 
 
 
Table 2.6 Percentage of rewarded subjects based on their answers to Question 3 
Treatment Number of  
Subjects 
Number of  
Rewarded 
Subjects 
Percentage of 
Rewarded 
Subjects 
Real Incentives- 
Sequential Questions 
22 11 50.00 
Real Incentives- 
Random Questions 
23 8 34.78 
 
 
The validity rate  
For each treatment, I calculate the validity rate (V) which is simply the percentage 
of valid estimates within each treatment. According to the previous findings, I found 
that “real incentives-random questions” treatment provides the highest validity rate 
(39.13%), then the “hypothetical incentives-random questions” (29.86%), “real 
incentives-sequential questions” (26.26%), and “hypothetical incentives-sequential 
questions” (22.22) follow (Table 2.7).  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13
 I have chosen the third question because  it was the randomly drawn question at the end of the “real 
incentives-sequential questions” session.  
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Table 2.7 Validity rates (V) for all treatments  
Treatment Variable Number of 
observations 
Number of valid 
observations 
V (%) 
Real incentives- 
Sequential questions 
First Quartile 66 15 22.72 
Median 66 24 36.36 
Third Quartile 66 13 19.69 
Total 198 52 26.26 
Real incentives- 
Random questions 
First Quartile 69 25 36.23 
Median 69 34 49.27 
Third Quartile 69 22 31.88 
Total 207 81 39.13 
Hypothetical incentives- 
Sequential questions 
First Quartile 57 13 22.80 
Median 57 15 26.31 
Third Quartile 57 10 17.54 
Total 171 38 22.22 
Hypothetical incentives- 
Random questions 
First Quartile 48 12 25.00 
Median 48 18 37.50 
Third Quartile 48 13 27.08 
Total 144 43 29.86 
 
 
Again, according to my predictions I found that subjective probabilities, elicited 
providing real monetary incentives and using random questions, are likely more valid 
than those elicited  providing real monetary incentives and using sequential questions. 
As demonstrated above, the low validity rate I found for the “real incentives-sequential 
questions” treatment depends on the fact that the provision of sequential questions along 
with monetary incentives makes the overall incentive incompatibility of the 
Exchangeability Game clear. 
Even when monetary incentives are not provided to subjects, I found that random 
questions perform better than sequential questions in terms of validity. This result may 
be due to the fact that, in the part of the Exchangeability Game related to the elicitation 
of the third quartile estimates, subjects are asked to choose between prospects that they 
have already ruled out in the elicitation of the first and second quartile estimates. For 
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example, a subject who has expressed median and first quartile estimates, respectively 
equal to g1/2 = 72 and g1/4 = 68, by answering the first and second set of binary 
questions, is then asked to express the third quartile estimate g3/4. She does so by 
answering a third set of binary questions which involve outcomes greater than 72, and, 
thus, in conflict with outcomes she has just chosen in previous questions. 
While this is clear to subjects who belong to the “hypothetical incentives-
sequential questions” treatment, this is not clear to the subjects who belong to the 
“hypothetical incentives-random questions” treatment. Thus, chaining may induce 
subjects to reduce the effort invested in the tasks, as they may believe that questions 
related to the elicitation of the third quartile are somewhat meaningless. My hypothesis 
here is supported by the fact that validity rate of third quartile estimates in the 
“hypothetical incentives-sequential questions” treatment (about 22 percent) is lower 
than that founded in the “hypothetical incentives-random questions” treatment (almost 
30, see Table 2.7). 
My prediction is also confirmed by the fact that while, in the “hypothetical 
incentives-sequential questions” treatment, the validity rate of third quartile estimates 
(almost 18 percent) is lower than that of first quartile (almost 23 percent), in the 
“hypothetical incentives-random questions” treatment, the validity rate of third quartile 
estimates (about 27 percent) is greater than that of first quartile (25 percent – again, see 
Table 2.7). The issue of meaningless sequential questions does not arise when monetary 
incentives are provided because subjects are assumed to put more mental effort into 
trying to earn as much monetary reward as they can.   
Unfortunately, I found relatively low validity rates for all my treatments. 
However, I do not believe this is due to the elicitation mechanism per se, but rather, to a 
series of different issues that I discuss below. First, such low validity rates may be due 
to the particular uncertain outcomes I investigated. As many subjects were, at least, 
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initially unlikely to be familiar with the pesticide risk issue addressed in the experiment, 
the validity of elicited probabilities may be undermined by the sense of insecurity that 
subjects have likely felt during the tasks (Frisch and Baron, 1988). In contrast, 
something simple and familiar to all, such as uncertainty about temperature, might yield 
higher validity. 
An alternative potential reason, as to why my subjects’ responses have such low 
validity rates, involves the test I have used to investigate the validity of elicited 
probabilities. Recall that to calculate the validity rate, I assume that each estimate is 
valid if and only if the certainty equivalent for Lottery 1 was equal to that for Lottery 2. 
This procedure seems to be quite constraining as it does not imply any statistical test, 
but is just a simple check of the equality. Unfortunately, here, I cannot either measure or 
disentangle the effect of such influencing factors, but only speculate on them.  
Given the large proportion of invalid probabilities, I also investigate their level of 
invalidity. Using the invalidity scale described above, I found that about 31 percent of 
the invalid probability measures are characterized by a very low level of invalidity, 
about18 percent by a low level, approximately 12 percent by a medium level, about 8 
percent by a high level, and about 31 percent by a very high level (Table 2.8 and Figure 
2.2). The fact that invalid observations are concentrated at the two extreme levels of 
invalidity emphasizes that subjects were either rather sophisticated about their 
probability estimates or not at all, with a smaller portion of the subjects falling in-
between.     
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Figure 2.2 Histogram of the percentage of subjective probabilities per level of invalidity 
 
 
 
The econometric analysis 
In this essay, I hypothesize that, not only experimental designs, but also socio-
economics characteristics of subjects and their degree of familiarity with the problem 
influence individual performances in terms of validity. This hypothesis is 
econometrically tested by estimating a discrete model in which the dependent variable 
VALID represents the validity of each estimate provided by each subject. The dependent 
variable takes the value 1 if and only if the estimate is valid according to Hypothesis 2, 
Table 2.8 Percentage of probabilities per level of invalidity in each 
treatment 
Level of Invalidity  ∆(CE) TRC TRU THC THU Total 
Very Low < 27 23.71 31.18 30.93 40.54 31.02 
Low 27-51 12.37 18.28 24.74 17.57 18.28 
Medium 52-76 8.25 17.20 11.34 9.46 11.63 
High 77-100 7.22 10.75 6.19 8.11 8.03 
Very High >101 48.45 22.58 26.80 24.32 31.02 
43 
 
and thus ( )[ ] ( )[ ]kjij GxLCEGxLCE :: = , with k ≠ i, k ≤ j14. Given that each subject i 
provides 9 estimates (g1/2, a1/2, r1/2, g1/4, a1/4, r1/4, g3/4,  a3/4, and  r3/4), I should have a 
panel data of 720 observations. However, I have 142 missing values for the dependent 
variable VALID because the Certainty Equivalent Game  investigating the validity of 
each estimate was not always displayed to subjects during the experiment depending on 
their choice behavior. 
In my model (Equation 2.1), the probability that each individual estimate is valid, 
depends on a set of explanatory variables available from survey-type questions given in 
the laboratory: the experimental treatment that subjects belong to, the socio-economics 
status of subjects themselves, and subjects’ degree of interest in the issue of food safety 
(see Table 2.9 for details about the explanatory variables).  
 
Equation 2.1 
 
iiiiiii TRISPRVTVALID 6543210 βββββββ ++++++=  
 
I estimate this model by using the generalized linear model estimation with and 
without robust standard errors. Hereafter, I focus on the estimation with robust standard 
errors that allows for clustering effects. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
14
 My dependent variable relies only on Hypothesis 2, but not on Hypothesis 1, because, while the latter 
only test the validity of median estimates, the former takes into account also first and third quartiles.   
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Table 2.9 Description of dependent and independent variables of Model 1 
Variable Definition Mean St.Dev. Min Max 
VALID = 1 if valid, = 0 otherwise .368 .482 0 1 
TRS = 1 if “Real Incentives-
Sequential Questions” 
treatment, 
= 0 otherwise 
.275 .446 0 1 
TRR = 1 if “Real Incentives-Random 
Questions” treatment, 
= 0 otherwise 
.287 .452 0 1 
THS = 1 if “Hypo Incentives-
Sequential Questions” 
treatment, 
= 0 otherwise 
.237 .425 0 1 
THR = 1 if “Hypo Incentives-
Random Questions” treatment, 
= 0 otherwise 
.200 .400 0 1 
G Number of days when the 
infestation risk is extremely 
high in April 
.333 .471 0 1 
A Number of apple containing at 
least one pesticide residue 
.333 .471 0
  
1 
R Number of apple containing 
multiple pesticide residue 
.333 .471 0 1 
50th PERCENTILE Observations related to the 
median of G, A, and R  
.333 .471 0 1 
25th PERCENTILE Observations related to the I 
quartile of G, A, and R  
.334 .471 0 1 
75th PERCENTILE Observations related to the II 
quartile of G, A, and R  
.333 .471 0 1 
CONSUMER = 1 if the subject eats at least 3 
apples a week 
= 0 otherwise 
.478 .500 0 1 
CONS_ASS = 1 if the subject is a member of 
a consumer association 
= 0 otherwise 
.062 .242 0 1 
PRODUCER = 1 if the subject produces 
apples 
= 0 otherwise 
.037 .190 0 1 
TRENTINO = 1 if the subject resides in the 
province of Trento 
= 0 otherwise 
.737 .440 0 1 
IPCC_TRUST Trust in IPCC’s predictions of 
the future temperature and 
precipitationa 
2.950 .545 0 4 
FEM_TRUST Trust in FEM’s predictions of  
fire blight’s infestation risk in 
the futurea 
2.587 .684 0 4 
SCENARIO_TRUST Agreement with the fact that 
farmers will use the chemical 
control in the future)b 
2.912 .778 0 4 
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AGE Age in years 32.746 12.578 19 68 
FEMALE = 1 if female,  
= 0 otherwise 
.4366 .4994 0 1 
SECONDARY_SCHOOL = 1 if the subject have this 
education level, 
= 0 otherwise 
.1830 .3895 0 1 
HIGH_SCHOOL = 1 if the subject have this 
education level, 
= 0 otherwise 
.5070 .5035 0 1 
UNIVERSITY = 1 if the subject have this 
education level, 
= 0 otherwise 
.3098 .4657 0 1 
SCIENTIFIC = 1 if the subject have a 
scientific education 
= 0 otherwise 
.487 .500 0 1 
a From 0= very high trust to 4= very low trust 
b From 0=strongly disagree to 4= strongly agree 
 
 
My first aim is to test again whether the probability of providing valid estimates 
depends on the provision of monetary incentives and the ordering of questions. The set 
of variables T consists of four dummies (TRS, TRR, THS, and THR) which take the 
value 1 if and only if the subjects belong to the experimental treatment that the variable 
represents. I observe that only subjects who belong to the “real incentives-random 
questions” treatment (TRR) have a statistically significant higher probability of 
providing valid estimates than those who belong to the “hypothetical incentives-
sequential questions” treatment (THS) which is used as baseline (Table 2.10). This 
result supports my previous findings from non-parametric testing and validity rate’s 
analysis.  
Two other sets of dummy variables have been included in my model, the first, RV, 
to capture whether the probability of providing valid estimates depends on the variable 
that subjects have to consider in playing the Exchangeability Game (G, A, or R), the 
second, P, to capture whether the validity of stated estimates is statistically different 
among median (g1/2, a1/2, and  r1/2), first quartile (g1/4, a1/4, and  r1/4), and third quartile 
46 
 
estimates (g3/4, a3/4, and  r3/4). However, I found no statistical difference in terms of 
validity between estimates related to diverse variables and diverse percentiles (Table 
2.10).  
Then, I also investigate the effects of socio-economic variable S on the probability 
that subjects provide valid estimates. I take my cues from extensive psychological 
research on the role that several factors can play in the determination of perceived risks. 
The variables under study are age (AGE), gender (FEMALE), education (SECONDARY, 
HIGH_SCHOOL, and UNIVERSITY), and the type of education (SCIENTIFIC). I 
expected  that the probability of providing valid estimates would possibly increase for 
high educated and younger subjects, but I found that older subjects’ estimates are more 
likely to be valid than the others (even though at 10 percent significance level) and 
education does not affect the validity of individual estimates, at least in my sample 
(Table 2.10).  
Furthermore, I consider also the interest of subjects on apples and food safety by 
including in the model a set of dummy variable (I) such as being an apple farmer 
(PRODUCER), being an apple consumer (CONSUMER), being a member of a 
consumer association (CONS_ASS), and being resident in the Province of Trento 
(TRENTINO). Although I expected to observe that subjects who reside in the Province 
of Trento and consume and/or produce apples perform better than the other in terms of 
validity, perhaps, because they are more interested than the others in the topic, my 
empirical results suggest no significant explanatory effects for these variables (Table 
2.10). 
Finally, I add in my model another set of dummy variables (TR) which capture 
whether subjects trust the predictions of IPCC about temperature and precipitation in 
2030 (IPCC_TRUST), the predictions of Edmund Mach Foundation (EMF) about the 
fire blight’s infestation risk in 2030 (EMF_TRUST), and my statement that apple 
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farmers will continue to use the chemical control against apple disease in the future 
(SCENARIO_TRUST). In this case, I predict that subjects who trust the information I 
gave them during the experimental instructions more likely provide valid estimates than 
the others. This is due to the fact that the truster plays the game more carefully. Despite 
that my predictions are confirmed overall, I found the trust in EMF’s predictions 
reduces the probability of providing valid estimates (Table 2.10).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.10 Generalized Linear Model 
Estimation of  Models 1and 2 
Dependent Variable: VALID 
Variable Model 1 Model 2a 
TRS .370** .370 
TRR .648* .648** 
THR .385** .385 
A -.058 -.058 
R -.173 -.173 
MEDIAN -.077 -.077 
25th PERC -.094 -.094 
FEMALE -.097 -.097 
AGE .019* .019*** 
SEC_SCHOOL -.086 -.086 
HIGH_SCHOOL -.016 -.016 
SCIENTIFIC .173 .173 
PRODUCER .584*** .584 
CONSUMER -.021*** -.021 
CONS_ASS .312 .312 
TRENTINO .067 .067 
IPCC_TRUST .359* .359*** 
FEM_TRUST -.355* -.355** 
SCEN_TRUST .253* .253*** 
CONSTANT -2.160* -2.160** 
LOG L.HOOD -347.702 -347.702 
a Robust standard errors and clustering effects 
*1% significance level 
**5% significance level 
***10% significant level 
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The consistency of my econometric results with those obtained from non-
parametric tests and validity rate’s analysis suggests that the provision of real monetary 
incentives along with random questions increases the validity of elicited estimates. 
Moreover, I found that socio-economic variables and the interest of subjects in the topic 
do not influence the likelihood of providing valid estimates. Only age and trust affect 
subjects’ ability to state valid estimates. 
 
Conclusion 
This essay has considered the influence of monetary incentives and question 
ordering on elicitation of subjective probabilities via the Exchangeability Method. In 
particular, I have shown that incentive compatibility of elicitation mechanisms 
determines the validity of elicited beliefs, at least in my study. In fact, when subjects are 
provided with monetary incentive along with sequential questions, which make subjects 
aware of the chaining and, thus, of the incentive incompatibility of the game, they try to 
strategically behave in order to get better rewarded at the end of the task and provide 
invalid subjective probabilities. On the other hand, when subjects are provided with 
monetary incentive, but random questions, which make the chaining and, thus, the 
incentive incompatibility of the game less transparent to subjects, they state their real 
beliefs and return valid subjective probabilities. Non-parametric tests demonstrate that 
only subjects provided with real monetary incentives and random questions state valid 
subjective probabilities.  
Although non-parametric tests have shown that subjects who are not provided 
with monetary incentives return invalid estimates, I demonstrated, by investigating 
validity rates, that subjects provided with random questions performs better than those 
provided with chained questions in terms of validity, given or not given monetary 
incentives. In fact, validity rate for “hypothetical incentives-random questions” are 
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substantially higher than that for “hypothetical incentives-sequential questions”. This 
result is likely due to the fact that sequential questions generate less meaningful tasks 
where subjects are asked to choose between two prospects that they have just ruled out 
in previous questions. This in turn may affect the validity of elicited probabilities, as 
subjects may invest less cognitive effort in playing the game.  
Those interested in using the Exchangeability Method can thus walk away with 
important messages here. First, incentive compatibility of elicitation mechanisms may 
affect the validity of elicited beliefs. Subjects are indeed more likely to provide valid 
estimates, over more of an entire distribution (than one measure of central tendency), if 
they are rewarded with real monetary incentives based on their performances and 
presented with experimental design where the chaining is hidden through a particular 
randomization of the questions. Second, and more disappointing perhaps, is that only a 
relatively small portion of stated estimates (almost 40%) can be considered valid under 
the definition I have applied here, which relates to behavioral axioms. The latter 
implication may be of little surprise to skeptics, but is relevant in my goal to continue to 
improve ways to provide reliable information about people’s subjective probabilities.  
Further researches on the validity of subjective probabilities elicited via 
Exchangeability Method might address these issues at the individual level. Instead of 
investigating the validity of each single observation, one might investigate the ability of 
each subject in providing valid estimates. This would be possible by collecting, for each 
subject, a number of observations large enough to test the validity of her/his stated 
probabilities by using non-parametric tests. 
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CHAPTER III. THE IMPACT OF INTERNAL VALIDTY ON SUBJECTIVE 
PROBABILITIES 
 
Introduction 
Despite progress that international and national authorities have made toward 
ensuring food safety (e.g., food-labeling, packaging, inspections), food-related risks still 
get the attention of a substantial proportion of consumers. For example, approximately 
30 percent of all Europeans remain concerned about health consequences of pesticide 
residues in food (European Commission, 2010).  
As both short- and long-term health outcomes induced by food safety are often 
uncertain, people’s own probability estimates may become crucial for understanding 
their choice-behavior towards food products or policies (Kivi and Shogren, 2010). In 
fact, probability estimates may dictate consumers’ choices far more than science-based 
predictions would. Several empirical investigations have shown that subjective 
probabilities often differ from science-based ones, even when people are told what these 
are (e.g., Riddel and Shaw, 2006). There might be two general reasons why such a 
discrepancy exists. First, while science-based probabilistic estimates may be simple 
averages based on frequency values for homogenous populations, individual subjective 
probabilities may be heterogeneous, and causes for this heterogeneity may be observed 
or unobserved. For many individuals, their subjective probabilities might be accurate, 
and not truly equal to the average population probability. Second, some individuals may 
make mistakes in processing probability-related information, and formulate estimates 
that are higher or lower than the science-based predictions. Much of what economists 
know about subjective probabilities has been borrowed from initial work by 
psychologists (e.g., Slovic, 1987). 
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Although an extensive literature has shown that subjective probabilities related to 
financial outcomes affect people’s choices under risk and uncertainty in several 
branches of applied economics (see Manski, 2004 for a review), a relatively small 
number of studies has investigated the influence that subjective probabilities related to 
health outcomes have on people’s behavior related to their everyday choices. A few 
studies have primarily coped with probability estimates of health outcomes related to 
smoking behavior (e.g., Viscusi, 1990; Gerking and Khaddaria, 2011) as well as 
drinking contaminated water (e.g., Jakus et al., 2009; Shaw et al., 2012). Unfortunately, 
little has been done into investigating whether subjective probabilities of health 
outcomes due to food safety affect people’s economic choices in their everyday life.  A 
small number of studies have shown that consumers’ subjective probabilities of health 
outcomes (i.e., mortality rate) due to the presence of pesticide residues in fresh fruit and 
vegetables drive their preferences for free-pesticide fresh fruit and vegetables in 
hypothetical markets. (e.g., Hammit, 1990; van Ravenswaay and Hoehn, 1991; Buzby et 
al., 1998).  
In contrast, here, I mainly examine probability estimates of food safety outcomes 
themselves. In particular, I investigate consumers’ subjective probabilities that given 
proportions of apples produced in the Province of Trento (Italy) will contain pesticide 
residues in 2030. Given that pesticide residues have consequences on health, 
consumers’ expectations about the future presence of pesticide residues in apples may 
affect their support for agricultural policies which aim to incentivize the production of 
free-pesticide fruit and vegetables. This issue becomes particularly important in areas 
like the Italy’s Province of Trento, where the saleable gross production of apple is 
approximately 23 percent of the entire agricultural saleable gross production in that area 
(P.A.T., 2010). 
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The bulk of the literature which has investigated subjective probabilities related to 
food safety has barely taken into account the fact that elicited subjective probabilities 
might not be valid, in the sense that subjective estimates might not obey to all axioms 
and theorems of Probability Theory (de Finetti, 1937; 1974a; 1974b). An exception is 
the experiment conducted by Cerroni et al. (2012) in which the validity of subjective 
probability elicited via the Exchangeability Method (EM) (Baillon, 2008; Abdellaoui et 
al., 2011), an innovative elicitation techniques based on the notion of exchangeable 
events (de Finetti, 1937), has been tested.  
Investigating the validity of subjective probabilities might help to better 
understand people’s choices under risk and uncertainty. In fact, the inclusion of invalid 
observations in subjective expected utility or other non-expected utility models to 
predict decision making, might generate biased results, especially if invalid 
observations systematically differ from valid ones in terms of magnitude. For example, 
if invalid subjective probabilities are systematically lower (or greater) then valid ones, 
consumers’ preferences (i.e., willingness to support) for agricultural policies might be 
underestimated (or overestimated).  
Given that, in this essay, by using Cerroni et al.’s (2012) results on the validity of 
subjective probabilities, I analyze the discrepancy between valid and invalid probability 
estimates in terms of magnitude. Furthermore, I also econometrically identify attitudinal 
and socio-economic factors that shape the subject’s perceptions, comparing my results 
with previous findings. 
 The remainder of the essay is laid out as follows. In the next section, I review 
previous studies dealing with perceptions of pesticide residues and its consequences on 
human health. Next, I define the aims of the current study and provide detailed 
information about the experimental design. Finally, I offer a discussion of my results.  
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Subjective probabilities and pesticide residues 
Many stated-preference (SP) studies have investigated the role of consumers’ 
perceptions of health outcomes due to pesticide residues in determining food-
purchasing behaviors. In general, these studies have shown a negative correlation 
between people’s perceptions of health outcomes due to pesticide residues and 
willingness to purchase products which contain those chemical substances. Many food 
products have been considered, ranging from general unlabeled ones (e.g., Misra, et al., 
1991; Eom, 1994; Rimal, et al. 2008) to specific types of fresh fruit and vegetables (e.g., 
Fu et al., 1999; Boccaletti and Nardella, 2000). 
Most studies do not focus on subjective probabilities, but on people’s concern 
about the severity of health consequences due to food safety15. For example, individuals 
might be asked to indicate the presence of health risks using simple descriptive labels 
(e.g. high, medium, or low), likert or other numerical scales.  
Eom (1994) elicited subjects’ concern about the presence of pesticides in general 
commercially grown food products by using a likert scale between 0 (no risk) and 10 
(very serious risk). This study found that the average concern across consumers was 
quite high, around 6.6. The same approach was taken by Fu et al. (1999), but for fresh 
fruit and vegetables. In this case, the average level of concern was extremely high, 
exceeding 6, on a scale between 0 and 7. In their experimental auction for residue-free 
foods, Roosen et al. (1998) used a simple scale of concern (1 to 5) to investigate the 
influence of subjective perceptions on consumers’ bidding behaviors. The approach 
recently used by Rimal et al. (2008) to elicit people’s perceptions of pesticide residues 
in food was even simpler. Here, individuals were simply asked to state whether the 
                                                          
15
 In contrast, one might use observed purchases or transactions as a way of revealing individuals’ sense 
of risk, but identification issues may easily arise in the effort to uncover the risks and sort these out from 
other influences on purchases, from the data. 
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problem of pesticides in food was serious, moderate or inexistent, and the finding was 
that more than half the subjects chose the serious option.  
Boccaletti and Nardella (2000), improved the approach used by Misra et al. 
(1991), implementing a Likert Attitude Scaling Procedure, where individuals are asked 
several questions and, then, an individual-specific score is calculated to measure the 
concern about pesticide residues on fresh fruit and vegetables. The mean score across 
consumers was 78 on the maximum of 100, where the latter value is not a probability 
per se, but indicates very high concern.  
While these simple efforts are appealing, they may be lacking in that they do not 
provide the information that would be ideal in actual modelling risky behaviours. For 
example, a reliable numerical estimate of probability can be directly used in either an 
expected utility or subjective expected utility framework, but measures of concern, or 
other responses, which are not probabilities cannot be used in this way (Manski, 2004).  
Several scholars have questioned whether perceptions measured on some scale, as 
done in some of the studies above, are good indicators of probability (e.g., Viscusi and 
Hakes, 2003). At the very least, one would have to make strong assumptions to re-map 
from a 0 to 10 discrete response scale to a 0 to 1 unit interval. This could be done for 
example, to get a relevant probability, which is of course a continuous variable on the 
unit interval. Simple recoding would of course make it impossible to obtain other 
probability estimates than in 10% jumps (10%, 20%, 30%, etc.). Hence, many other 
studies have paid closer attention to the elicitation of actual numerical probability 
measures. In most of these studies the elicitation scheme is simple, and people are just 
asked to state probability estimates. The specific magnitude of the outcome that will 
happen is typically first presented, and individuals are then asked about the probability 
of this occurring to others (e.g., Viscusi 1990, asks people to guess how many smokers 
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out of 100 will get, or die from, lung cancer), or to themselves, but many variations in 
presentation are possible. The techniques which directly elicit subjective probabilities 
are called direct methods (Spetzler and Von Holstein, 1975). 
Extensive research, much of which is in the psychology literature, has shown that 
people do not easily understand numerical probabilities (especially small ones), and, 
given that, suggests different approaches (i.e., frequencies) for making people willing 
and able to state their best estimates (e.g., Gigerenzer and Hoffrage, 1995; Hammit and 
Graham, 1999; Corso et al., 2001).  
Several studies suggest that mortality risks be couched as deaths per 100,000 or 
some other number in the population, avoiding small decimal place numbers that are 
confusing. Buzby et al. (1998) ask subjects their own subjective probability of dying 
from consuming fresh products containing pesticides in a similar manner, specifically, 
as the annual number of deaths per 1 million individuals. Since this probability-
estimation task may be difficult for laypeople, subjects in both of these studies were 
provided with risk ladders showing probability of dying from more-familiar causes of 
death. The mean probability estimate was roughly 43 deaths per million in the 
population, per year.  
Williams and Hammit (2001) used this same basic technique to examine the 
annual fatality rate per 1 million in the population of the United States for several 
categories of food hazards, and one of these was also the presence of pesticide residues 
in food. Generally, consumers perceived the probability of dying due to pesticides as 
being greater than either natural toxins or microbial pathogens. In particular, to 
conventional buyers, the annual median fatality rate because of pesticide residues on 
fresh products was 50 per million, while, to organic food buyers, this was 200 per 
million. 
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Although direct methods are very easy to design and implement, they have been 
questioned because of the quality or accuracy of the elicited subjective probabilities. In 
the cognitive psychology literature the ability, or more specifically, the willingness of 
subjects to put efforts in expressing their belief in numerical probabilities, has been 
extensively debated. The elicitation of numerical probabilities is of course easy and 
feasible, but reliable results are not guaranteed (Manski, 2004).  
An alternative way of eliciting subjective probabilities consists of using subjects’ 
choices, most often made over lotteries and gambles. In particular, probability measures 
are indirectly estimated by the researcher at the points for which people show their 
indifference between lotteries or gambles, which can be thought of as games that the 
subjects play. These techniques which indirectly elicit subjective probabilities are called 
indirect methods (Spetzler and Von Holstein, 1975). Those methods are assumed to be 
less demanding than direct methods from a cognitive point of view as subjects are not 
asked to directly express a numerical probability, but to compare risky outcomes and 
choose the most likely one (Spetzler and Von Holstein, 1975).  
To my knowledge, the first application of an indirect technique in eliciting 
subjective probabilities related to the presence of pesticide residues in food is 
represented by the Cerroni et al. (2012)’s experimental investigation. In particular, that 
study has elicited numerical subjective probabilities that given proportions of apples 
will contain pesticide residues by using the EM, an indirect elicitation techniques in 
which subjects are asked to bet a given amount of money on a given outcome rather 
than on an alternative one. Subjective probability are indirectly inferred at the point for 
which subjects show their indifference for betting on one of the two outcomes.  One 
innovative aspect of this elicitation techniques consists in asking subjects to focus on 
the severity of the outcome, rather than on the probability of a given outcome to occur. 
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This investigation into outcomes is rare, as compared to attention paid by previous 
studies to subjective probabilities of endpoint risks, such as human mortality or 
morbidity risk (Kuhn and Budescu, 1996). 
The study by Cerroni et al.’s (2012) differs from the bulk of the literature which 
investigates subjective probabilities related to food safety in other aspects. First, while 
previous investigations were purely hypothetical, that study used monetary incentives to 
push subjects into stating their real expectations (Vossler and Evans, 2009). Given that, 
it must be considered the first economic experiment eliciting subjective probabilities of 
food safety outcomes related to pesticide residues. Second, Cerroni and colleagues 
(2012) have analyzed for the first time the validity of subjective probabilities related to 
food safety outcomes.  They identify valid estimates by using a validation procedure 
based on the deFinetti’s notion of coherent subjective probabilities (de Finetti, 1937; 
1974a; 1974b).  
In particular, they have tested whether validity of elicited subjective probability 
depends on the monetary incentives and the order of questions. To test their hypotheses, 
selected participants were randomly assigned to four treatment group, the real monetary 
incentives-sequential questions, the real monetary incentives-random questions, the 
hypothetical monetary incentives-sequential questions, and the hypothetical monetary 
incentives-random questions. In the hypothetical treatments, subjects are only given the 
show-up fee, while in the real monetary incentives treatments, one randomly selected 
subject from each treatment has the chance to win up to an additional 100€ based on 
her/his choices during the experimental games. The only difference between the 
sequential and random treatments is the order of the questions, and in fact subjects in 
the former treatments face sequentially ordered questions, while subjects in the latter 
face randomly ordered questions. Previous research within decision analysis and 
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management science  has shown that the order of questions undermines the reliability of 
subjective probabilities (e.g., Wakker and Deneffe, 1996). 
Investigating the validity within each treatment group, Cerroni et al. (2012) found 
that subjects provided with real monetary incentives and random questions more likely 
return valid estimates. Examining the validity of each elicited subjective probability, 
they found that the proportion of valid estimates is 29.72 percent in the sample. In 
particular, they showed that the proportion of valid subjective probabilities is 39.13 
percent in the real monetary incentives and random questions treatment, followed by 
29.86 percent in the hypothetical monetary incentives and random questions treatment, 
26.26 percent for the real monetary incentives and sequential questions treatment, and 
22.22 percent for the hypothetical monetary incentives and sequential questions 
treatment. This suggests that in each treatment group there is a relatively small portion 
of valid subjective probabilities, and the real compensation with sequential responses 
out-performs the other treatments.  
As subjective probability are often incorporated in the standard subjective 
expected utility or other non-standard theories of decision making under risk and 
uncertainty to model and predict risky behaviors, the identification of valid probability 
estimates becomes crucial to obtain highly predictive models, and thus, reliable findings 
on subjects’ choice behavior. This is particularly true if valid observations 
systematically differ from invalid ones in terms of magnitude. In the latter case, failure 
to recognize valid subjective probabilities might induce us to over- or underestimate 
subjects’ true expectations, and hence, to wrongly predicts their behavior.  
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Objectives 
By drawing on Cerroni et al.’s (2012) investigation and using the same dataset 
they have used in their analysis, I first investigate subjective probability estimates that 
given proportions of apples will contain pesticide residues.  
Second, I examine the potential discrepancy between valid and invalid subjective 
probabilities to fully understand whether failure to recognize validity implies an over- 
or underestimation of consumers’ true probability estimates.  
Finally, I estimate a behavioral model to identify attitudinal and socio-economic 
factors that affect the subject’s probability estimates of pesticide residues in apples. 
 
The empirical application 
The case study 
The fire blight is a bacterial disease that has damaged and killed apple plants in 
the Province of Trento since 2003 (EMF, 2006). The current infestation rate which is 
the number of days in which the infestation occurs in the blossoming period is less than 
1 per cent. The infestation rate depend on climatic parameters such us temperature and 
precipitation. In this region of Italy, farmers currently adopt preventative measures 
based on pesticide usage in the form of copper compounds or Acibenzolar-S-metile to 
control the mild negative consequences that fire blight has on apple production. 
However, the future increase of the infestation rate, which is predicted to reach 17 
percent in 2030, might eventually induce farmers to use new pesticides for preventative 
and curative control of fire blight. One candidate is the antibiotic streptomycin, 
currently forbidden under Italian law, but which has been already used in U.S., 
Germany, Belgium, and The Netherlands to control fire blight (Németh, 2004). After 
providing subjects with a description of the relevant scenario, as well as precise 
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information about the values that the random variables under study had in the last ten 
years (from 2000 to 2009), I ask them to express their subjective probabilities of the 
number of apples containing pesticide residues in 2030 by playing my experimental 
games.  
 
The dataset 
The dataset  is the same used by Cerroni et al. (2012) and consists of 1,200 
probability estimates, 400 for each of the three random variables under study which are: 
the number of apples, a, containing at least one residue in a sample of 100 apples in 
203016, the number of apples, r, containing at least two residues (multiple residues) in a 
sample of 100 apples in 203017, and the number of days, g,  during which the infestation 
will occur during the blossoming period in 203018. The latter variable g was added 
because of the potential link between the development of fire blight and the presence of 
pesticide residues in apples. 
These variables were selected after having interviewed approximately 20 focus 
group subjects. The year 2030 is chosen because the best available science predicts that 
the heavy development of new phytopathology, as the fire blight, will start 
approximately twenty years from now in the Province of Trento.   
 
The sample 
The pool of sample subjects consists of 80 individuals between 18 and 70 years 
age who live in the Province of Trento. The sample is not, strictly speaking, randomly 
selected because subjects were recruited outside food markets, but it is still quite 
generally representative of people living in this Province because most all people in the 
                                                          
16
 The apple containing residues are those containing at least one residue beyond the level of 0 mg/kg. 
17
 The apple containing residues are those containing at least two residues beyond the level of 0 mg/kg. 
18
 The blossoming period usually occurs in April in the Province of Trento. 
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region go shopping in those markets at some point or another. A show-up fee of 25€ 
was given to each participant as a compensation for agreeing to come into the 
experimental lab of the University of Trento to take part in the experiment. 
 
Methods 
The elicitation of subjective probabilities: the Exchangeability Method 
In this section, I briefly describe the EM, the technique used by Cerroni et al. 
(2012) to elicit subjective probabilities. The EM consists of multiple binary questions 
where subjects are only asked to bet a certain amount of money on one of the two 
disjoint subspaces in which the whole state space of the variable under study has been 
previously divided based on their choices. When subjects become indifferent to bet on 
one disjoint subspace rather than on the other, they are assumed to perceive those 
subspaces as equally likely (Spetzler and Von Holstein, 1975). This method allows 
eliciting several point estimates of the individual cumulative distribution function 
(CDF) of the random variable under study for each experimental subject. Interested 
readers may find additional details about the EM in Abdellaoui et al. (2011), Baillon 
(2008), and Cerroni and Shaw (2012).  
The EM is applied to elicit subjective probabilities of three random variables, a, r, 
and g. As the EM is formally described in Cerroni et al. (2012), for brevity’s sake here I 
only describe my application of the EM that concerns the number of apples containing 
at least one residue in a sample of 100 apples in 2030 (variable a). At the beginning of 
the game, I ask subjects to express the lower (a0) and upper bounds (a1) of the event 
space A. In this way, I identify the individual-specific range outside of which subjects 
are essentially certain that the outcome cannot happen at all. Assume that subject i states 
that a0 is equal to 60 apples and a1 is equal to 76. This means that she/he believes that 
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the probability that the portion of apples containing at least one pesticide residue in 
2030 will be outside these bounds (i.e. less than 60 and greater than 76) is equal to zero.  
The second step involves asking a series of questions to establish the value of 
a1/2 that corresponds with the 50th percentile of the subjective CDF, the median 
estimate. The first binary question is generated by splitting the event space in two 
prospects by using the following algorithm, 60 + [(76
 
- 60)/2] = 68. It follows that the 
first binary question implies a choice between prospects A1={60<x<68} and A2={68≤x< 
76} (see Example 1 in Appendix A). Following the first choice, the exercise is repeated 
using a bisection of the chosen prospect. For example, if subject i has chosen prospect 
A1={60<x<68}, the second binary question asks subjects to choose between prospects 
A3={60<x<64} and A4={64≤x<68}. The bisectioning process goes on until the subjects 
become indifferent between the two prospects; at this point I am able to estimate the 
median point a1/2 of the subject’s subjective CDF. This estimate indicates that there is a 
50 per cent chance that the number of apples that will contain at least one pesticide 
residue in 2030 will be equal to or less than a1/2. A similar process can be followed to 
determine as many other points for the individual’s subjective CDF as is desired, 
depending on limitations of the subjects’ attention spans. For this study I also elicit the 
25th percentile (a1/4) and the 75th percentile (a3/4).  
Subjective probabilities are elicited for variables a, g, and r, defined above. For 
each variable, I elicit 5 percentile estimates, the lower bound (g0, a0, and r0), the 25th 
percentile (g1/4, a1/4, and r1/4), the 50th percentile (g1/2, a1/2, and r1/2), the 75th percentile 
(g3/4, a3/4, and r3/4), and the upper bound (g1, a1, and r1).  
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The validity of subjective probabilities: the Repeated Exchangeability Game and 
Certainty Equivalent Game  
In this section, I briefly describe two additional experimental games that were 
implemented by Cerroni et al. (2012) to facilitate the identification of valid probability 
measures, the Repeated Exchangeability and Certainty Equivalent Game (REG and 
CEG, respectively).  
The REG allows us to identify valid probability measures at the sample level by 
statistically comparing estimates of the 50th percentile elicited via the EM (a1/2) with 
those elicited via the REG (a1/2’). The REG differs from the standard EM as the lower 
and upper bounds of the event space are not defined by a0 and a1, but by the subjective 
probability estimates of g1/4 and g3/4 elicited via the Exchangeability Game.  
The sample provides valid subjective probabilities if and only if these estimates 
do not significantly differ from each other. In the CEG, subjects are presented with two 
choice tasks, say CT1 and CT2, both containing six binary questions, each asking 
subjects to choose between a gamble and a certain amount of money.  
Next, I provide an example of the CEG that concerns the number of apples 
containing at least one residue in a sample of 100 apples in 2030 (variable a). Assume 
that subject i provides us with an estimate of a1/2 that is equal to 66 apples, in CT1 
she/he has to choose between options A (place a bet of x € on the fact that a is lower 
than 66) or B (take the certain amount of money z = 0, 25, 49, 51, 75, and 100€). For the 
second choice task CT2, she/he has to choose between options A (a bet of x € on the 
fact that a is greater than or equal to 66) or B (take the amount of money z = 0, 25, 49, 
51, 75, and 100€). The certainty equivalent for the lottery described in option A is 
determined by looking at the first question of the six in the choice task in which the 
subject switches from choosing option A to choose option B (the amount of money). 
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The CEG is played for the 25th percentile (g1/4, a1/4, and r1/4), the 50th percentile (g1/2, 
a1/2, and r1/2), and the 75th percentile (g3/4, a3/4, and r3/4). The CEG allows identification 
of valid probability estimates at both the sample and individual level. In the former 
case, the sample provide valid probabilities if and only if CE estimates related to CT1 
and CT2 does not statistically differ from each other. At the individual level, each 
specific probability observation is valid if and only if the CE estimates related to CT1 
and CT2 are equal. In this case, I do not use any statistical procedure, but I only 
ascertain that each pair of CE measures (for CT1 and CT2) is equal.  
 
Results 
The analysis of subjective probabilities 
On average, estimated bounds of variable a suggest that the subjects believe the 
number of contaminated apples out of 100 will be between 56 and 75. Using 
information from the estimated 25th percentile, I argue that subjects believe there is 
only a 25 percent chance that the number of apples containing pesticides will be lower 
than or equal to 66. Using average values for the 50th and the 75th percentiles it appears 
that the subjects attach a 50 percent chance to the fact that the number of bad apples will 
be lower than or equal to 69, and 75 percent chance to the fact that this number will be 
lower than or equal to 71 apples (Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1b). Taking into account that 
the number of apples with at least one pesticide residue at present (in 2009) is 63 out of 
100 (Italian Ministry of Health, 2010), I conclude that subjects do not in fact perceive 
an increase in the number of apples containing at least one pesticide residue by the year 
2030 to be particularly substantial and, very likely.  
Following the same general approach, I interpret percentile estimates related of 
the r variable, which is the number of apples containing multiple residues in a sample of 
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100 apples in 2030. In this case, I found that the lower bound (r0) is about 31, the 25th 
percentile (r1/4) is 42, the 50th percentile (r1/2) is 45, the 75th percentile (r3/4) is 48, and 
the upper bound (r1) is 52 (Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1c). As might be expected, the 
average percentile estimates of r are always smaller than those of variable a (see Figure 
3.1b and 3.1c) because the number of apples with multiple residues should always be 
lower than the number of apples with at least one residue. However, given that 31 
apples, over the 63 containing at least one residue, have multiple residues in 2009 
(Italian Ministry of Health, 2010), I deduce that subjects perceive an increase in the 
number of apples with multiple residue to be quite significant and likely. For example, 
they think that there is 75 percent chance that the number of apples with multiple 
residues will be 48 at the worst. 
To summarize, although subjects believe that the number of apples containing one 
residue or more will not significantly increase by the year 2030, they predict that the 
number of apples containing multiple residues (more than one) will significantly 
increase. This means that the number of apples containing only one pesticide residue 
will decrease, but the number of apples with multiple residues will significantly grow 
by the year 2030.  
Considering the infestation rate which is the number of days in which the 
infestation will occur during the blossoming period in 2030, I found that the lower 
bound (g0) is 6, the 25th percentile (g1/4) is 8, the 50th percentile (g1/2) is 9, the 75th 
percentile (g3/4) is 10, and the upper bound (g1) is 12 (Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1a). Given 
the fact that the number of days in which the infestation actually occurred in 2000, 
2005, and 2010 was very close to zero, I conclude that subjects perceive the infestation 
rate in 2030 as being quite high and likely. 
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Table 3.1 Summary statistics of percentile estimates for each variable 
Variable Obs. Mean Median St.Dev.   Min    Max 
gL 80 6.176  5.000 4.677 1.000 29.000 
bleg1/4 80 7.912  6.750 5.879 0.205 29.250 
g1/2 80 9.175  7.500 6.320 0.500 29.500 
g3/4 80 10.250 9.000 6.228 0.750 29.750 
gU 80 11.925 10.500 6.072 1.000 30.000 
aL 80 56.354 60.000 20.455 4.000 90.000 
a1/4 80 65.637 68.000 21.879 5.000 96.000 
a1/2 80 69.200 72.000 21.907 6.000 98.000 
a3/4 80 71.187 74.500 21.896 8.000 99.000 
aU 80 75.450 80.000 21.706 10.000 100.000 
rL 80 31.392 32.000 16.381 4.000 82.000 
r1/4 80 42.387 38.000 19.066 5.000 90.000 
r1/2 80 44.875 41.000 18.941 6.000 92.000 
r3/4 80 47.700 43.000 19.334 8.000 93.000 
rU 80 51.825 47.000 19.241 12.000 100.000 
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Figure 3.1 The average number of days in which the infestation will occur during the blossoming 
period in 2030 (a), the average number of apples containing at least one residue in a sample of 100 
apples in 2030 (b), and the average number of apples containing more than 1 residue in a sample of 
100 apples in 2030 (c). 
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The difference between valid and not valid subjective probabilities 
Using results on validity obtained by Cerroni et al. (2012) via the Certainty 
Equivalent Game, for each random variables, I compare the magnitudes of valid and 
invalid estimates at both the sample and individual levels19. At the sample level, I find 
here that the valid estimates are lower than invalid ones for each percentile (the 25th, the 
50th, and the 75th) of each variable (a, r, and g) (Table 3.2). However, by using the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) and the Mann-Whitney U (MWU) tests, I find that the 
discrepancy between the magnitudes of valid and invalid estimates is not statistically 
significant for all variables, a, g, and r (Table 3.3). Hence, even if my results suggest 
that failure to recognize validity may induce researchers to overestimate subjects’ true 
probabilistic expectations, this finding is not statistically supported.  
 
 
Table 3.2 Average values of variable g, a, and r considering valid and invalid observations 
Variable Valid at 
sample level 
Invalid at 
sample level 
Valid at 
individual level 
Invalid at 
individual level 
 Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean 
g1/4 23 7.326 57 8.149 19 9.421 34 8.500 
g1/2 23 8.434 57 9.473 35 8.228 43 9.674 
g3/4 23 9.583 57 10.512 12 9.916 33 9.196 
Tot. 69 - 171 - 66 - 110 - 
a1/4 23 62.691 57 66.823 21 66.476 46 68.195 
a1/2 23 67.304 57 69.964 25 63.280 55 71.890 
a3/4 23 69.652 57 71.807 19 68.157 34 68.882 
Tot. 69 - 171 - 65 - 135 - 
r1/4 23 38.782 57 43.842 17 36.470 46 47.782 
r1/2 23 41.826 57 46.105 26  38.846 54 47.777 
r3/4 23 45.608 57 48.543 18 38.944 38 46.815 
Tot. 69 - 171 - 61 - 138 - 
 
                                                          
19
 I used data from the Certainty Equivalent Game because it allows me to take into account first, second, 
and third quartile estimates, while the Repeated Exchangeability Game only deals with second quartile 
estimates. 
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Next, the valid and invalid estimates are compared at the individual level. For the 
random variables a and r, I found the same pattern as before, the 25th, the 50th, and the 
75th percentiles are lower in valid estimates as compared to invalid ones (Table 3.2). 
Using the KS and MWU tests, I found that such a discrepancy between valid and 
invalid estimates is not statistically supported for variable a, while it is for variable r. In 
particular, valid estimates of 25th percentile (r1/4) are statistically lower than the 
corresponding invalid ones (Table 3.4).  
I found a different pattern for the variable g; valid estimates of the 25th and 75th 
percentiles (g1/4 and g3/4) are greater than the corresponding invalid estimates, while 
valid estimates of the 50th percentile (g1/2) are lower than invalid ones (Table 3.2). 
However, these results are not statistically supported by the KS and the MWU tests 
(Table 3.4).   
Table 3.3 Comparison of valid and invalid percentile estimates at sample level 
Null Hypothesis Mann-Whitney U  
Test 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov  
Test 
H0 P-value P-value 
gvalid = ginvalid 0.194 0.149 
g1/4, valid = g1/4, invalid 0.413 0.444 
g1/2, valid = g1/2, invalid 0.412 0.704 
g3/4, valid = g3/4, invalid 0.466 0.444 
avalid = ainvalid 0.249 0.299 
a1/4, valid = a1/4, invalid 0.284 0.567 
a1/2, valid = a1/2, invalid 0.543 0.664 
a3/4, valid = a3/4, invalid 0.733 0.534 
rvalid = rinvalid 0.160 0.562 
r1/4, valid = r1/4, invalid 0.290 0.444 
r1/2, valid = r1/2, invalid 0.437 0.844 
r3/4, valid = r3/4, invalid 0.503 0.923 
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In general, the valid estimates are smaller than the invalid ones in variable a and r, 
but greater in variable g. However, I note that the such discrepancies are statistically 
supported only for variable r, but not for a and g. For what concern r, mistakes appear 
here to result in upward bias, and thus, failure to recognize validity may thus result in an  
overestimation of subjects’ average probabilistic expectations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Factors shaping subjective probabilities 
To further analyze the factors that explain subjects’ probabilistic expectations of 
both the number of apples containing pesticide residues and the fire blight’s infestation 
rate, I estimate three empirical models. Key factors (see Table 3.5 for definitions) 
considered are the subjects’ perceptions of climate change and farmers’ usage of 
pesticides; their trust in science-based predictions about climate change and fire blight’s 
Table 3.4 Comparison of valid and invalid percentile estimates at individual level 
Null Hypothesis Mann-Whitney U  
Test 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov  
Test 
H0 P-value P-value 
gvalid = ginvalid 0.890 0.842 
g1/4, valid = g1/4, invalid 0.408 0.214 
g1/2, valid = g1/2, invalid 0.336 0.503 
g3/4, valid = g3/4, invalid 0.463 0.250 
avalid = ainvalid 0.259 0.488 
a1/4, valid = a1/4, invalid 0.560 0.705 
a1/2, valid = a1/2, invalid 0.206 0.278 
a3/4, valid = a3/4, invalid 0.933 0.928 
rvalid = rinvalid 0.002 0.035 
r1/4, valid = r1/4, invalid 0.048 0.018 
r1/2, valid = r1/2, invalid 0.068 0.164 
r3/4, valid = r3/4, invalid 0.199 0.676 
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infestation rate; their status of apple producers or apple consumers; their socio-
economic features such as age, gender, place of residence, education, and income. 
 
 
Table 3.5 Description of independent variables of Model 1,2,and 3 
Variable Definition Mean St.Dev. Min Max 
VALID_S = 1 if the observation is valid at sample 
levela, 
= 0 otherwise 
0.287 0.453 0 1 
VALID_IND_G = 1 if the observation is valid at sample 
levela, 
= 0 otherwise 
0.375 0.485 0 1 
VALID_IND_A = 1 if the observation is valid at 
individual level,  
= 0 otherwise 
0.325 0.469 0 1 
VALID_IND_R = 1 if the observation is valid at 
individual level,  
= 0 otherwise 
0.306 0.462 0 1 
IPCC_TRUST Trust in IPCC’s predictions of 
temperature and precipitation (at 5 
levels)b 
2.950 .545 0 4 
CC_H&N = 1 if the subject believes that the 
climate change is due to both  human 
activities and natural processes, 
= 0 otherwise 
0.600 0.490 0 1 
CC_H = 1 if the subject believes that the 
climate change is mostly due to human 
activities, 
= 0 otherwise 
0.337 0.473 0 1 
CC_HH = 1 if the subject believes that the 
climate change is only due to human 
activities, 
= 0 otherwise 
0.062 0.242 0 1 
PEST_NOW Subjects’ beliefs about the current usage 
of pesticides by farmersc 
3.200 0.994 0 4 
PEST_FUT Subjects’ beliefs about the future usage 
of pesticides by farmersc 
2.912 0.779 1 4 
EMF_TRUST Trust in EMF’s predictions of  fire 
blight’s infestation risk in the futured 
2.587 0.685 1 4 
CONSUMER The number of apples consumed by the 
subjects in a week 
3.700 5.160 0 20 
CONS_ASS = 1 if the subject belongs to a consumer 
association, 
= 0 otherwise 
0.062 0.242 0 1 
APP_LINK = 1 if the subject is tied to apple 
production, processing and marketing.  
= 0 otherwise 
0.212 0.409 0 1 
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TRENTINO = 1 if the subject resides in the Province 
of Trento, 
= 0 otherwise 
0.737 0.440 0 1 
AGE Age in years 33.625 13.213 19 68 
FEMALE = 1 if female,  
= 0 otherwise 
0.436 0.4994 0 1 
SEC_SCHOOL = 1 if the subject have this education 
level,= 0 otherwise 
0.183 0.3895 0 1 
HIGH_SCHOOL = 1 if the subject have this education 
level,= 0 otherwise 
0.512 0.5035 0 1 
UNIVERSITY = 1 if the subject have this education 
level,= 0 otherwise 
0.300 0.4657 0 1 
INCOME The yearly net income in 2010 in 
thousand €  
18.968 19.560 0.075 0.115 
a The observations valid at sample level belongs to the real incentive and random questions treatment 
b I ask subjects whether IPCC’s predictions will happen  surely, very likely,  maybe,  not likely, or 
never.     
c I ask people if they agree with the statement saying that farmers mostly use chemical control against 
apple diseases, 0=strongly disagree, 1=disagree, 2=do not know, 3=agree, 4=strongly agree.  
d I ask subjects whether FEM’s predictions about fire blight will happen  surely, very likely,  maybe,  
not likely, or never. 
 
Given that my dependent variables are all essentially fractions, I do not estimate 
my models (Model 1, 2, and 3) by using a simple OLS estimator, although many apply 
the linear probability model to such data. Here, I use the Generalized Linear Model 
(GLM) along with robust standard errors (Papke and Woolridge, 1996). Observations in 
80 groups are clustered because each subject provides three different percentile 
estimates (25th, 50th, and 75th percentile) for each random variable under study (g, a, and 
r), and these may be correlated.  
The general empirical specification common to the three models is: 
 
Equation 3.1 
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In Model 1, the dependent variable (y) is each subject’s estimates of the number 
of days in which the infestation will occur during the blossoming period in 2030 (g), in 
Model 2, each subject’s estimates of the number of apples containing at least one 
residue in a sample of 100 apples in 2030 (a), and in Model 3, each subject’s estimates 
of the number of apples containing multiple residue in a sample of 100 apples in 2030 
(r). 
In all models, I investigate the difference between valid and invalid estimates in 
terms of magnitude by creating two sets of dummy variables. The first, VALID_S, 
assumes value 1 if and only if the estimates are valid at the sample level according to 
the rules in Cerroni et al. (2012). The second, VALID_IND, equals 1 if and only if the 
estimates are valid at the individual level according to the rule in Cerroni et al. (2012). 
In Equation 3.1 these variable are grouped in the set of variables called VALIDITY. 
Considering Model 2 (a) and 3 (r), the negative signs of both coefficients are consistent 
with result from non-parametric testing which show that average valid estimates are 
lower than invalid ones (see Paragraph 5.2). However, estimated coefficients are not 
statistically supported in either Model 2 (a) or Model 3 (r) (Table 3.6). In contrast, in 
Model 1, I found that VALID_S and VALID_IND have positive signs, but their influence 
is not statistical significant even in this case (Table 3.6).  
The composition of the indicator variable ATTITUDE used to explain the random 
variable g strongly differs from that used to explain the other variables, a and r. For 
what concerns Model 1 (g), ATTITUDE captures subjects’ trust in the IPCC’s 
predictions about climate change (IPCC_TRUST) and their beliefs about the human 
and/or natural determinants of this phenomenon (CC_HN, CC_H, and CC_HH). In the 
former case, I predict that the number of days in which the infestation will occur during 
the blossoming period in 2030 (g) increases when subjects trust the IPCC’ predictions 
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because, during the instructions, I inform subjects about the positive correlation 
between the fire blight’s infestation rate and the increase in temperature and 
precipitation. The coefficient of the variable IPCC_TRUST has the positive and 
statistically significant expected sign (Table 3.6). In the latter case, my results show that 
subjects who believe that climate change is only due to human activities (CC_HH) 
perceive the infestation to be more likely than subjects who blame the climate change 
on both natural and human processes (CC_HN). These results are consistent with the 
psychology literature about perceptions of risk which has shown that technology-
induced risks are strongly perceived by laypeople, more than nature-induced ones (e.g., 
Slovic, 1987). 
For what concerns Model 2 (a) and Model 3 (r), the set of variables ATTITUDE 
captures subjects’ beliefs about the current and future usage of pesticides to control 
apple disease (PEST_NOW and PEST_FUT) and subjects’ trust in Edmund Mach 
Foundation’s predictions about the fire blight’s infestation rate (EMF _TRUST). As I 
expected, the number of apples that respondents think will contain pesticides increases 
with subjects’ agreement on the fact that farmers mainly use pesticides (PEST_NOW) 
and they keep doing this in the future (PEST_FUT). However these results are 
statistically significant in Model 3 (r) (at 5% and 1% significance level), but not in 
Model 2 (a). Then, I hypothesize that the number of apples containing pesticide residues 
in 2030 increases when subjects trust the Edmund Mach Foundation’s predictions 
showing that the fire blight’s infestation rate will increase from the 1% of 2010 to the 
17% of 2030. This hypothesis is supported by the positive and significant coefficients of 
the variable EMF_TRUST in both Model 2 and 3, at 1% and 5% significance level, 
respectively (Table 3.6). 
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The APPLE_LINK variable set, which consists of three diverse dummy variables, 
APP_LINK, CONSUMER, and CONS_ASS, is present in all models. In Model 1 (g), 
people who work in apple production, processing, and marketing (APP_LINK) provide 
lower estimates of the number of days in which the fire blight’s infestation will occur 
during the blossoming period in 2030 than the others. This finding was quite predictable 
because farmer and, more broadly, experts have a better knowledge of the actual low 
infestation rate in the Province of Trento. However, this coefficient is not statistically 
significant. As I expected, people who are tied to the apple industry (APP_LINK) have 
generally higher estimates of pesticide residues in apples than others, and the positive 
coefficient is statistically significant in Model 2 and 3 at the 1% and 10% significance 
level, respectively (Table 3.6). In this case, farmers and people who are involved in the 
apple industry know much better than the others that chemicals are commonly used to 
control apple diseases. 
While the fact that the number of apples consumed weekly (CONSUMER) does 
not affect estimates regarding the fire blight’s infestation rate (g) is not surprising, it is 
striking that this variable weakly influence the consumers’ perceptions of pesticide 
residues in apples (a and r). The variable CONSUMER is negative and statistically 
significant in Model 2 (a) at the 5% significance level, but it is not significant in Model 
3 (r) (Table 3.6). In contrast, I found that members of consumer associations 
(CONS_ASS) who are assumed to be very concerned about pesticide residues have 
higher estimates of both a and r than the others (Table 3.6). The coefficient of this 
variable is positive and statistically significant at 1% and 5% level, respectively.  
I have the same set of socioeconomic variables in all my models. Although I 
found that women (FEMALE) have higher estimates as predicted in the literature about 
76 
 
risk perceptions (e.g., Flynn et al., 1994; Krewski et al., 1994; Lin, 1995; Hamilton, 
1985; 1995), the coefficients are not statistically significant in all of my models.  
I found contrasting results for the age of subjects (AGE). For what concerns g, my 
results are consistent with the previous literature on health risks (e.g., Krewski et al., 
1994; Williams and Hammit, 2001), as I found that elderly subjects have higher 
estimates of the infestation rate than the others (at the 10% significance level). In 
contrast, I found that the number of apples containing pesticide residue decreases with 
age in Model 2 (a) and 3 (r) (5% and 1% significance level, respectively) (Table 3.6). 
This result may be due to the fact that younger consumers are expected to be more 
sensitive to food-safety issues than older ones because they have all their lives in front 
of them.  
Again, I found contrasting results about education. In Model 1 (g), my results 
support the hypothesis that more educated subjects (UNIVERSITY) have lower estimates 
of the infestation rate than the others (SEC_SCHOOL) as suggested by Dosman et al. 
(2001) and Williams and Hammit (2001). However in Model 2 (a) and 3 (r) I found that 
people with a master degree have higher estimates of apples containing pesticides than 
people with lower education levels (5% significance level) (Table 3.6). Again, this 
divergence may be due to the fact that highly educated subjects are expected to be more 
sensitive to food-safety issues. 
Subjects who were born in the Province of Trento provided lower estimates of the 
number of apples containing at least one pesticide residue (a)  than the others (at the 
10% significance level in Model 2). I speculate that they may trust their fellow citizens 
or unconsciously protect their own apple products.  However, the same variable was not 
statistically significant for what concern multiple pesticide residue in Model 3 (r). 
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Finally, I found that subjects with higher incomes have higher perceptions of the 
presence of pesticide than others, at least in Model 2 (a).   
Among models which explain the perceptions of pesticides, Model 2 related to the 
number of apples with one or more residues (a) is more predictive than Model 3 related 
to the number of apple with multiple residues (r) (Table 3.6). There are various 
hypotheses that may explain the lower explanatory power of Model 3. First, this may be 
related to the discrepancy between valid and invalid probability estimates detected at 
individual level for variable r, second, boredom and fatigue may have mattered, given 
that half of the sample assessed the variable r at the end of the experiment, while in the 
other half the order of questions has been randomized. 
 
Table 3.6 Generalized Linear Model Estimation 
Variable Model 1 (g) Model 2 (a) Model 3 (r) 
VALID_S .079 -.163 -.207 
VALID_IND .060 -.084 -.228 
IPCC_TRUST .266*** - - 
CC_H -.196 - - 
CC_HH .746* - - 
EMF_TRUST -.070 .643* .355** 
PEST_NOW - .082 .122** 
PEST_FUT - -.001 .003* 
APP_LINK -.564 .653* .400*** 
CONSUMER .018 -.044** -.005 
CONS_ASS -1.077* 1.004* .541** 
FEMALE .018 .138 .092* 
AGE .011*** -.024** -.020* 
TRENTINO -.284 -.381*** .160 
HIGH_SCHOOL -.469 .234 .205 
UNIVERSITY -1.097* .713** .442** 
INCOME .001 .001** .001 
CONSTANT -1.118* -.578 -1.161* 
LOG P.L.§ -73.990 -83.265 -91.752 
*1% significance level, **5% significance level, ***10% significant level  
§ Log Pseudo-Likelihood *** 
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In summary, the results of my econometric analysis support many of the 
predictions I had about the potential factors shaping people’s perceptions of the fire 
blight’s infestation rate and the presence of pesticide residues in apples, especially those 
related to consumer association membership, age, and education. Moreover, by using an 
innovative approach, an economic experiment based on an indirect elicitation technique, 
I have quite consistent results with previous studies investigating the same issues with 
different techniques, and when I have not, I provide plausible explanations of these 
discrepancies.  
 
Conclusion 
Elicited subjective probabilities are important because they explain behaviors 
under risk and uncertainty and thus, can be used in risk-oriented behavioral models that 
incorporate them, such as the subjective expected utility model, or non-expected utility  
models. In general, empirical results in previous studies have indicated that consumers 
have a high level of anxiety about such contaminants in food. Using data elicited via an 
indirect technique applied in a laboratory experiment, I have shown that subjects are in 
fact not very concerned about a general increase of pesticide residues in apples at a key 
policy-related future date, but are more concerned about the presence of multiple 
residues in apples. These results have important policy implications, given the fact that 
consumers’ subjective probabilities of pesticide residues in apples might affect their 
purchasing behaviors and ultimately, prices and quantities transacted in fresh fruit 
markets. 
However, the main contribution of this essay consists of investigating the 
discrepancy between valid and invalid subjective probabilities. My results suggest that  
valid estimates are smaller than the invalid ones for what concern the number of 
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contaminated apples (variable a and r), but greater for what concern the number of days 
in which the fire blight’s infestation will occur in the blossoming period (g). However, I 
note that the such discrepancies are statistically supported only for variable r which 
indicates that number of apples that will contain multiple residues.  
My econometric analysis has investigated factors shaping perceptions of pesticide 
residues in apples and it provides other useful information. For example, I found that 
the average consumer in my subject pool is not particularly concerned about this issue; 
in fact their expectations about the presence of pesticide residue do not statistically 
differ between apple consumers and non-consumers. In contrast, members of consumers 
associations are very sensitive to the problem, as they show higher probabilistic 
expectations. I also found that young and highly educated subjects are expected to be 
more sensitive to food-security issues. These results highlight, and enhance my 
understanding of the factors affecting perceptions and, thus, shed light on consumers’ 
behaviors. 
As a final caveat, note that my subjects were asked to answer questions about 
risky outcomes pertaining to a future policy period, in the year 2030. It is possible that  
subjects discounts the future differently than others do, which could affect each 
subject’s probability estimates. This suggests future research to try to simultaneously 
estimate discount rates and subjective probabilities within the context of the EM 
approach that I have implemented here. To my knowledge, thus far no one has 
considered the elicitation of both simultaneously within the context of the EM. 
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CHAPTER IV. THE INCORPORATION OF SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITIES 
INTO CHOICE EXPERIMENTS TO TEST SCENARIO REJECTION 
 
Introduction 
In the past two decades, several stated-preference (SP) studies, mainly choice 
experiment (CE) applications, have shown the key influence that the specification of the 
status quo (SQ) alternative has on subjects’ choice-behavior, and thus, on estimated 
welfare measures (e.g., Kontoleon and Yabe, 2003; Scarpa and Ferrini, 2005; Meyerhoff 
and Liebe, 2009). These studies largely focus on the scenario rejection phenomenon that 
occurs when subjects always reject new alternative scenarios in favor of the SQ 
(Cameron et al., 2010).  
In essay investigates another phenomenon related to the design of the SQ 
alternative, a potential mental adjustment to the SQ scenario. Discrete choice’ modelers 
have generally assumed that subjects make choices while fully accepting the attribute 
levels provided by the researcher in the SQ, however, recent SP studies have shown that 
subjects often adjust the information given in the SQ on the basis of their prior beliefs 
and/or expectations (e.g., Burghart et al., 2007; Cameron et al., 2010). These studies 
have shown that the scenario adjustment phenomenon potentially affects the reliability 
of SP studies because individuals may be responding to attribute levels that are not 
actually present in the presented scenario. Thus, if this phenomenon is not taken into 
account, behavioral models of decision-making might have low predictive power, and 
produce biased welfare estimates. 
My CE application examines whether the scenario adjustment takes place when 
subjects are asked to make choices under risk, and, in particular, what extent subjects 
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adjust the risk information provided in the SQ on their prior subjective risks20.  
Subjects’ tendency to revise their own risk estimates once they acquire additional 
information has been extensively investigated in the literature within the economics of 
risk and uncertainty. Several studies have shown that subjects commonly update their 
prior subjective risks using new information, perhaps, in a Bayesian fashion (e.g., 
Viscusi, 1985; Viscusi, 1989). However, the weight that an individual puts on their prior 
versus new or experiential information is an empirical issue (Viscusi and Magat, 1992), 
and whether individuals are Bayesians remains controversial (Cameron, 2005b; Baker et 
al., 2009).  
I specifically investigate to what extent a mental adjustment to the SQ scenario 
takes place in choices over alternative R&D programs which are geared to control the 
future spread of new apple diseases in the Province of Trento in Italy. As compared to 
the farmers’ standard practice, which is to use pesticide residues, the implementation of 
new methods, based on natural organism and resistant varieties of apples, will reduce 
the number of apples containing pesticide residues by 2030. This is the year during 
which the spread of new diseases are predicted to occur, according to the best scientific 
estimates. Given the uncertainty surrounding R&D programs’ outcomes, the alternatives 
presented in choice tasks depict the risk of having contaminated apples in 2030.  Here, I 
refer to the “risk” of having contaminated apples as the probability that given numbers 
of apples will contain pesticide residues in 2030. Given this context, the scenario 
adjustment might easily affect subjects’ choices over the alternative R&D programs. In 
fact subjects might either make choices by using the provided probability of having 
contaminated apples given by the researcher in the SQ, or, they might adjust the 
provided estimates based on their estimates, if the latter differs from the former. This 
                                                          
20
 In this Chapter, I switch to the term “risk” because SP studies commonly use this term, rather than the 
term “probability”, for example the mortality risk literature. However, these terms are equivalent, in fact, 
the mortality risk is just the probability of dying.  
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investigation also helps to identify risk communication strategies that make people more 
willing to support policies that they may not initially perceive as important based on 
their priors. 
Previous SP studies have investigated the occurrence of the scenario adjustment 
simulating subjects’ choice-behavior and willingness-to-pay (WTP) estimates under a 
full acceptance of attribute levels presented in the SQ alternative (e.g., Burghart et al., 
2007; Cameron et al., 2010). However, as ex-post econometric simulations may not 
mirror real decision making processes, and, hence, true WTP estimates (Burghart et al., 
2007), in my study, I actually elicit WTP when the scenario adjustment takes place and 
when it does not. More specifically, I investigate the extent of this phenomenon in CEs 
by comparing subjects’ WTP estimates when risk levels presented in the SQ alternative 
either coincide or do not with subjects’ perceived ones. In particular, I hypothesize that 
when the presented risk levels are lower than expected ones, subjects positively adjust 
the information given in the SQ on their expectations, and, hence, they provide higher 
WTP estimates. In contrast, when the presented risk levels are higher than expected 
ones, subjects negatively adjust the information given in the SQ on their expectations, 
and, hence, they provide lower WTP estimates.  
To investigate subjects’ choice behavior when the risk level presented in the SQ 
coincide with subjects’ perceived ones, I  design subject-specific SQ alternatives based 
on each subject’s subjective probabilities of having contaminated apples in 2030 if 
farmers will continue to use conventional chemical controls. This study, to my 
knowledge, represents the first attempt to incorporate subjective probabilities into a CE 
design. In order to accomplish this, I implement a best-worst Pivot CE. Pivot CE are 
extensively used in transport economics to generate subject-specific SQ alternatives 
based on the information that each subject provides about her/his most recent trip. 
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Afterwards, attribute levels of other alternatives are generated by pivoting them on the 
attribute levels of the SQ alternative by adding or subtracting given percentages or 
values from the baseline attribute levels (e.g., Hensher and Greene, 2003; Hensher and 
Rose, 2007; Hensher et al., 2009). 
To generate the subject-specific SQ alternatives, subjective probabilities that 
given numbers of apples will contain pesticide residues in 2030 have been elicited using 
the Exchangeability Method, an elicitation techniques based on the de Finetti’s notion of 
exchangeable events (de Finetti, 1937; 1974a; 1974b). This innovative method 
indirectly elicits subjective probabilities by asking subjects to play lotteries containing 
uncertain outcomes occurring in the future (Baillon, 2008; Abdellauoi et al., 2011, 
Cerroni and Shaw, 2012; Cerroni et al., 2012a).  
In the remainder of the essay, I first review previous finding about the concept of 
a mental scenario adjustment. Next, I describe the CE survey, provide testable 
hypotheses, and present my discounted Expected Utility Theory driven models. In the 
final section, I offer some conclusions based on the experimental results that were 
obtained.  
 
Literature review 
Realism and scenario adjustment  
CE studies, and more broadly SP applications, generally investigate subjects’ 
choice-behavior in hypothetical markets that have been designed by researchers. These 
techniques are extremely useful to investigates the demand for goods and services 
which either are not yet in the market or do not have a market at all. The latter is the 
case of my R&D programs. However, as subjects’ choices in such hypothetical markets 
may or may not mimic their choices in real situations, a lot of effort has been put in 
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designing SP investigations where hypothetical markets appears as real as possible to 
subjects21. One way to create hypothetical, but realistic choice contexts, among many 
others22, consists in designing a baseline scenario that subjects perceive to be real. 
Recently, discrete choice research, much of which is been in the field of transport 
economics, has advanced knowledge on how to construct realistic choice scenarios 
(e.g., Adamowicz et al., 1997; Hess and Rose, 2009).  
A lack of realism in characterizing the SQ alternatives might undermine the 
credibility of the study, inducing subjects to express untruthful preferences and 
researchers to infer biased estimates. This has been an issue in health, transportation, 
and, other fields in economics, prevalently, in the context of choice under conditions of 
risk.  For example, despite the fact that, many studies provide all subjects with the same 
SQ alternatives in which an average science-based estimate of  mortality risk due to a 
given illness is presented, these risks may depend a great deal on  specific ages, gender, 
and other factors. To overcome this issue, other SP studies have created group-specific 
SQ alternatives in which mortality risk estimates depend at least on age and gender 
(e.g., Krupnick et al., 2002; Alberini et al., 2006).  
Incorporating “realism” into SP is difficult, in fact, even supposedly realistic 
baseline scenarios might not be credible to all subjects. An extensive research within 
psychology and, to some extent, in economics, has demonstrated that subjective risk 
perceptions widely differ from risks that subjects currently experience in their life (e.g., 
Slovic, 1987; Botzen et al., 2009;  Jakus et al., 2009). It is easy to imagine that any 
discrepancy between subjective estimates and science-based ones becomes even larger 
when future and uncertain outcomes are taken into account (e.g., Cameron, 2005b; 
Cerroni et al., 2012b). 
                                                          
21
 This was one of the first recommendations for SP studies highlighted in the NOAA guidelines. 
22
 Another way consists in making CE incentive compatible when the case study allows this. 
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When subjects are presented with SQ alternatives where risk estimates are not 
consistent with their subjective estimates, they have three main decision-making 
strategies that they can adopt. First, they can ignore their own beliefs by assuming that 
science-based estimates presented in the SQ alternative are right and credible. These 
subjects essentially abandon any priors they have, putting full weight on new risk 
information they receive. Second, they can at least partially adjust the information given 
in the SQ alternative on their own subjective estimates. To be clear, they mentally adjust 
the risk information provided in baseline scenario to better fit their risk perceptions. 
This phenomenon is becoming commonly known in the literature as the scenario 
adjustment (Bughart, 2007; Cameron et al., 2010). Third, taking this behavior to the 
extreme, they can completely ignore the information provided in the SQ and make 
choices according to their subjective estimates.  These subjects essentially put zero 
weight on new information, clinging to their prior, which might be based on some 
personal knowledge or experience. 
If the adjustment phenomenon occurs, the SQ used by subjects during their 
choices differs from the one researchers consider in the choice modeling. This might 
generate confounding factors that researchers are not able to capture in their models, 
and, therefore, compromise the accuracy of welfare estimates (Cameron et al., 2010).  
Two approaches have been identified to deal with the scenario adjustment in SP 
studies. Both rely on the collection of additional information about subjects’ beliefs or 
expectations of the levels in one or more key attributes that describe the SQ alternative. 
The first approach investigates to what extent the scenario adjustment affects 
subjects’ choices and, hence, their welfare estimates by using simulations. In choice 
models, the elicited information is interacted with utility parameters to control for the 
presence of the scenario adjustment. The estimated coefficients of these interaction 
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terms indicate to what extent the adjustment takes place. This information is commonly 
elicited by using quite simple debriefing questions which simply ask subjects what 
would have been the SQ’ attribute levels that they expected to face in the choice tasks. 
The fact that such questions are presented to subjects after they have taken their choices, 
might have influenced their answers. For example, compliant respondents might 
formulate an estimate that is more in line with the SQ’s attribute than their real prior. 
This would reduce the effect of the scenario adjustment. Subjects’ choice-behavior and 
WTP estimates under a full acceptance of the SQ scenario are ex-post simulated. By 
using this approach, some stated choice studies dealing with risk attributes have 
detected scenario adjustment and they have shown the substantial influence that this 
phenomenon has on welfare measures (Burghart et al., 2007; Cameron et al., 2010). 
However, as ex-post simulated choices might strongly depend on the used econometric 
specification, this approach might generate biased estimates of the effect that the 
scenario adjustment produces on subjects’ behavior and WTP (Burghart et al., 2007).  
In contrast, the second approach aims to avoid the scenario adjustment and all 
related issues, rather than investigate this phenomenon. This approach, developed in 
transportation studies, relies on the design of more realistic CE survey by using pivot 
experimental designs (e.g., Hensher and Rose, 2007; Hensher et al., 2009). As SQ 
alternative’s attribute levels provided by researchers do not generally coincide with the 
trips that commuters often make to reach given destinations, in Pivot CEs, each subject, 
in each choice task, is presented with a specific SQ alternative where attribute levels are 
based on her/his most recent commuting trip. To generate such a design, attribute levels 
of the SQ are first elicited from subjects themselves, and, then, used to design the 
attribute levels of the other alternatives presented in the choice tasks. In particular, the 
latter attribute levels are generated by adding and/or subtracting given amounts or 
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percentages from the corresponding attribute level in the SQ alternative. Unfortunately, 
Pivot CE has been shown to induce subjects to systematically prefer the realistic SQ 
alternative over the hypothetical generated alternatives (e.g., Hess and Rose, 2009; Rose 
and Hess, 2009). 
To my knowledge this approach has never been implemented in other field than 
transportation, and, more important, has never been used to investigate risky choices. 
However, since a long tradition in psychology (e.g., Slovic, 1987), now spilling over 
into economics, has shown that subjective risks are often better predictors of choice 
rather than science-based estimates, Pivot CE might be used for incorporating 
subjective estimates into stated choice experiments to better predict choices under 
situations of risk. Despite the fact that economists, more than psychologists, have put a 
lot of effort in incorporating subjective risks into modeling behavior (see early work on 
smoking decisions by Viscusi (1990); more recently see Mansky, 2004; Cameron, 
2005a; Riddel and Shaw, 2006; Viscusi and Zeckhauser, 2006; Botzen et al., 2009;  
Jakus et al., 2009; Shaw et al., 2012), to my knowledge, subjective risk estimates have 
never been directly incorporated in stated choice’s experimental designs. 
 
Elicitation of Subjective probabilities  
As this essay investigates whether the scenario adjustment takes place in a risky 
choice context, the investigation of subjective probabilities becomes crucial to 
understand how subjects react to the risk information provided in the SQ alternative. To 
accomplish this, I need to elicit the subjective probability that given outcomes will 
occur in the future. 
There is an extensive literature in decision analysis and management science, now 
spilling over into behavioral and experimental economics, about the elicitation of 
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subjective probabilities related to financial outcomes. Few has been done in other fields 
(e.g., Viscusi, 1990; Wakker and Deneffe, 1996; Cerroni and Shaw, 2012).  
In previous stated choice studies, subjective probabilities have been commonly 
elicited by using the so called direct techniques which consist in directly asking subjects 
to express the probability that given outcomes will occur in the future (e.g., Viscusi, 
1990; Williams and Hammit, 2001; Riddel and Shaw, 2006). Although the latter 
approach is very appealing for its simplicity, it may generate biased results as subjects 
are often not willing and/or able to express probabilities in numerical terms (Koriat et 
al., 1980; Zimmer, 1983)23.  
An alternative way for eliciting subjective probabilities consists in asking 
subjects to play lotteries. In these techniques, called indirect, probability estimates are 
indirectly estimated at the point for which subjects becomes indifferent to choose 
playing one lottery instead of the others (Spetzler and Stael Von Holstein, 1975).There 
are many variations on this theme24, but a novel approach deserves to be mentioned, the 
exchangeability method (EM). This elicitation technique consists of a set of binary 
questions in which subjects are asked to bet a certain amount of money on one of the 
two disjoint subspaces that come from the bisection partition of the whole state space of 
the variable under study. The sectioning process depends on subjects' betting-behavior, 
and proceeds until subjects become indifferent to bet on one disjoint subspace rather 
than on the other. When this point is reached, subjects are assumed to perceive those 
subspaces as equally likely (Spetzler and Von Holstein, 1975). This method allows 
eliciting several percentiles of each subject's cumulative distribution function (CDF) of 
                                                          
23
 One might argue that, subjective probabilities do not need to be elicited, but they can be inferred from 
subjects’ choices. Unfortunately, in this study, the elicitation of subjective probabilities is necessary to 
investigate how subjects react when provided with risk information which differs from their prior risk 
estimates.    
24
 To keep the essay of a manageable length we refer interested readers to Cerroni et al. (2012a). 
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the random variable under study. This approach is particularly appealing because 
outcomes are not associated to probability measures, and, hence, unlike other 
techniques, it does not force individuals to process numerical probability estimates (e.g., 
Baillon, 2008; Abdellaoui et al., 2011, Cerroni and Shaw, 2012). 
In Chapter 2, I have shown that the validity of percentile estimates elicited via the 
EM depends on the ordering of questions and the provision of monetary incentives to 
subjects based on their betting-behavior during the tasks25 (Cerroni et al., 2012a). Here, 
validity is tested using the de Finetti’s (1937) notion of coherence, under which 
subjective probabilities are valid if and only if they obey to Probability Theory. On the 
one hand, the ordering of questions affects validity only when more than one percentile 
estimates of the random variable under study are elicited, otherwise not26. This is due to 
the fact that the number of binary questions needed to elicit the first percentile is so 
small that subjects do not become aware of the chaining nature of the elicitation 
procedure. On the other hand, the provision of real monetary increases the validity of 
elicited percentile estimates, for example, when monetary incentives are hypothetical 
only 38 percent of the elicited first percentile estimates are valid, while, when monetary 
incentives are real the percentage of valid first percentile estimates is almost 50 percent 
(Cerroni et al., 2012a). However, in Chapter 3, I have shown that validity does not 
impact the magnitude of percentile estimates, and hence, valid and invalid observations 
do not differ from each other (Cerroni et al., 2012b).  
 
                                                          
25
 In experimental economics, monetary incentives are commonly provided as they are assumed to induce 
subjects to state their real beliefs, expectations, or preferences, at least, when incentive compatible 
elicitation techniques are used. Cerroni et al. (2012a) have rewarded subjects whose expectations were 
consistent with science-based predictions as subjective probabilities were elicited for outcomes occurring 
in 2030, too far in the future to wait their realization. 
26
 Cerroni et al. (2012b) have elicited three percentile estimates for each of the three variables that they 
investigated in their experiment. Each percentile estimates of each variable was elicited by using a 
specific block questions. In two experimental treatments these blocks of questions were randomized to 
hide the chained sequence of questions. 
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Objectives and testable hypotheses 
In this essay, I develop a novel two-stage approach to investigate the extent of the 
scenario adjustment by comparing marginal WTP (MWTP) estimates between subjects 
who might potentially adjust SQ’s risk levels on their own estimates, and subjects who 
might not. In the first stage, subjective probabilities that given outcomes will occur are 
elicited, and, in the second stage, the sample is split into two treatment groups. In the 
Subjective SQ (SSQ) treatment, the risk presented in the SQ is consistent to each 
subject’s probability estimate, while in the Objective SQ (OSQ) treatment, it is not. The 
OSQ treatment group is further split into two other sub-groups. In one, the risk depicted 
in the SQ is lower than each subject’s estimate (OSQLOW), while, in the other, it is 
higher than that (OSQHIGH). 
This approach implies the incorporation of subjective probabilities, elicited using 
the EM method, into the CE’s experimental design by using the pivot approach. While 
previous pivot CE applications have been commonly used to generate SQ alternatives 
which mirror the most recent trip that subjects have experienced, my investigation 
represents the first attempt of using pivot CE to create SQ alternative which are 
consistent and coherent with subjective probabilities of future outcomes. To my 
knowledge, this is also the first study using subjective probabilities elicited via the 
exchangeability method to model subjects’ choice behavior.  
In this essay, the scenario adjustment is investigated by testing the following 
hypotheses27: 
 
 
                                                          
27
 These hypotheses allows me to test the scenario adjustment under the Expected Utility Theory 
framework. In other non-standard theories of decision making under risk and uncertainty, such as 
Cumulative Prospect Theory and Rank Dependent Utility Theory, the reference point affects subjects’ 
choices. 
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Hypothesis 1.  
H0: MWTPSSQ  ≥  MWTPOSQ_LOW   
H1: MWTPSSQ < MWTPOSQ_LOW   
 
If the null hypothesis (H0) is rejected, subjects who belong to the OSQLOW 
treatment positively adjust the risk information provided in the SQ on their estimates. 
As they make choices having in mind SQ’s attribute levels greater than those provided 
in the SQ, their MWTP estimates are greater than those of subjects who belong to the 
SSQ treatment. In contrast, if the null hypothesis (H0) is not rejected, subjects who 
belong to the OSQLOW fully accept the risk information given by the researcher (i.e., no 
scenario adjustment), or they negatively adjust the risk information provided in the SQ 
because they overreact to such information. 
 
Hypothesis 2.  
H0: MWTPSSQ ≤ MWTPOSQ_HIGH   
H1:  MWTPSSQ > MWTPOSQ_HIGH   
 
If the null hypothesis (H0) is rejected, subjects who belong to the OSQHIGH 
treatment negatively adjust the risk estimate provided in the SQ on their subjective 
estimates. These subjects have lower MWTP than subjects who belong to the SSQ 
treatment because they unwarily generate in their mind risk estimates lower than that 
presented in the SQ. In contrast, if the null hypothesis (H0) is not rejected, the scenario 
adjustment does not occur, or it occurs in the opposite direction (i.e., positive 
adjustment) as they overreact to such information. 
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The empirical application 
This essay investigates people’s preferences and, therefore, implies their 
maximum willingness to pay (WTP) for R&D strategies proposed by the Province of 
Trento to control new apple diseases. These diseases will likely develop in this region 
by 2030, according to the best available science. An example is the fire blight, a 
bacterial phytopathology that has already damaged and killed some apple orchards in 
the Province of Trento, at least since 2003 (EMF, 2006). 
Farmers might need to use other new and more effective pesticides than ones 
being currently used. For example, they might introduce the antibiotic streptomycin that 
is currently forbidden by the Italian legislation, but which is already used in U.S., 
Germany, Belgium and The Netherlands for controlling fire blight (Németh, 2004). The 
usage of the chemical control will affect the presence of pesticide residues on apples, 
which is already quite high today. In fact, 63 apples out of about 100 contain pesticide 
residues, according to scientific data (Italian Health Ministry, 2010).  
Given the fact that pesticides pose health risks to people who eat apples, the 
Province of Trento plans to launch R&D programs which study, develop, and implement 
alternative methods to control the future spread of new diseases. These programs are 
based on both the identification of natural organisms that are antagonists of causal 
pathogens, and the development of resistant varieties of apples that will be unaffected 
by new diseases. The introduction of these new methods will have a positive effect on 
the number of apples containing pesticide residue in 2030. Such R&D programs are 
funded thanks to a specific tax that the Province of Trento will ask the population to pay 
an annual sum in the period between 2012 and 203028.  
                                                          
28
 Subjects might object the tax as they might believe that farmers should pay for R&D programs. 
However this risk is avoided as agricultural R&D programs are commonly supported by public funds in 
the Province of Trento.  
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Methodology 
My survey differs from conventional SP, and, especially from previous CE, 
studies. After introducing the empirical scenario to subjects, another section in which 
subjective probabilities are elicited by using the EM is added (Baillon, 2008, Abdellaoui 
et al., 2011; Cerroni et al. 2012a). Afterward, subjects’ preferences for alternatives R&D 
programs aiming to reduce the risk of having contaminated apples in 2030 by using a 
best-worst pivot CE are elicited. In this section, the sample is divided into treatment 
groups, each presented with a specific version of the CE which differs from the others in 
the design of the SQ alternative, and, more specifically, in the risk of having 
contaminated apples in 2030 presented in the SQ alternative. 
Below, I describe my empirical application of the exchangeability method and 
the best-worst pivot CE as well as the sampling procedure and my experimental 
treatments.  
 
Exchangeability Method 
In my application of the EM, the random variable under study (a) is the number 
of apples, produced in the Province of Trento that will contain pesticide residue in 2030 
if farmers will control the spread of new diseases by using pesticides. Only the 50th 
percentile of each subjects' CDF is elicited (a1/2). In the first step of the EM, subjects are 
asked to express the lower and upper bounds of the state space of variable a (Sa), 
defined as amin and amax. These bounds contain all outcomes that have a non-zero 
probability to occur. For example, if subject i believes that ai,min=70 and ai,max=86, then, 
she/he implicitly assumes that only outcomes belonging to this range will occur.  
In the second step of the EM, subject i is asked to answer a series of binary 
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questions that reveal the 50th percentile of the her/his subjective CDF (ai,1/2). In the first 
binary question, Sa is divided at a point a1 into two prospects, say A1={amin<x<a1} and 
A1’={a1≤x<amax}, where a1={amin+[(amax-amin)/2]}. To my subject i,  ai,1={70+[(86-
70)/2]}=78 apples, and, thus, the first binary question asks her/him to bet on prospect 
A1={70<x<78} or prospect A1’={78≤x<86}. If prospect A1 is chosen by the subject i, the 
implication is that she/he believes the probability of occurrence of the sub-event A1 is 
greater than that of the sub-event A1’, so that P(A1)≥P(A1’) and ai,1≥ai,1/2, and thus, 
P(70<x<78) ≥ P(78≤x<86) and 78≥ ai,1/2. This process is repeated until subject i reaches 
a value ai,1+z (with z=1,2,...,n) such that she/he is indifferent between A1+z and A1+z’. 
When this point is reached, it follows that P(A1+z)=P(A1+z’) and ai,1/2=ai,1+z. For 
example, assume that subject i was indifferent between prospect A1+z={70<x<74} and 
prospect A1+z’={74≤x<76}, this implicitly means that P(70<x<74)=P(74≤x<76) and 
ai,1/2= 74. To conclude, my subject i believes that there is 50% chance that the number of 
apples containing pesticide residue will be between 70 (ai,min) and 74 (ai,1/2), and another 
50% chance that it will be between 74 (ai,1/2) and 86 (ai,max). For simplicity's sake, at the 
end of the task, subject i is presented with a summary screen-shot in which he/she is 
informed that, based on her/his choice-behavior, there is 50% chance that the number of 
apples containing pesticide residues will be 74 (ai,1/2), at the worst, and another 50% 
chance that it will be 86 (ai,max), at the worst. As a check, each subject is asked to 
confirm her/his estimate29.  
In this application, binary questions are not randomized and monetary incentives 
are not provided to subjects based on their choice-behavior. While the ordering of 
questions does not matter in this study as only first percentile estimates are elicited, the 
lack of monetary incentives might have undermined the validity of elicited observations 
                                                          
29
 The majority of our subjects confirmed estimates inferred from their choice-behavior.  
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(Cerroni et al., 2012a). Nevertheless, in order to design a coherent survey, given the 
hypothetical nature of the choice context presented in the CE, a hypothetical version of 
the EM is implemented. The choice context is inevitably hypothetical because R&D 
programs’ outcomes will be available only in 2030. However, as Cerroni et al. (2012b) 
have shown that validity does not affect the magnitude of percentile estimates elicited 
via the EM, here, I assume that, being elicited percentile estimates coherent or not with 
probability theory, they still mirror subjects' expectations about the number of apples 
that will contain pesticide residues in 203030.   
 
Best-worst pivot choice experiment 
After having interviewed 34 subjects during three focus-group meetings, three 
key attributes were selected to describe the effect of the R&D programs on the presence 
of pesticide residues in apples31. These are: 
(i) the maximum number of apples containing pesticide residues in a sample of a 
hundred in 2030 (N),  
(ii) the probability of this number N occurring (P), and  
(iii) the yearly tax in euro that taxpayers of the Province of Trento must pay in 
the period between 2012 and 2030 if they want R&D programs to be launched in 
2012 (T).  
 
In the CE application, each subject is presented with 12 choice tasks, containing 
each three alternatives. Using the best-worst approach, subjects are asked to select the 
                                                          
30
 Although, in this study, I did not investigate the validity of elicited subjective probabilities, I am aware 
of the fact that subjects’ choices based on valid and invalid probability measures might differ from each 
other. This could be another interesting topic to research on.  
31
 Focus-group meetings were conducted on July 4th, 16th, 23th. 2011 at the Department of Economics, 
University of Trento (Italy). 
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most and least preferred alternatives in each choice task. In this application subject can 
choose to indicate first either their most preferred or least preferred alternative. If 
subjects indicate first their most preferred alternative, then they are asked to indicate 
their least preferred alternatives. In contrast, if subjects indicate first their least preferred 
alternative, then they are asked to indicate their most preferred alternatives. The main 
advantage of using best-worst CEs is in the availability of more data from each subject, 
enhancing the value of small samples. If subject i is presented with a choice task 
containing a set of alternatives J, I can assume that she/he chooses her/his most 
preferred alternative in each of J-1 sequential choice tasks, each containing one 
alternative less than the previous choice task (Scarpa et al., 2010). Another advantage of 
the best-worst approach, as compared to rating or simple ranking, is that subjects can 
more easily and consistently identify extreme options in terms of preference. In contrast, 
they are more cognitively demanding than standard choice experiment where subjects 
are asked to indicate only their preferred alternative (Marley and Louviere, 2005; 
Vermeulen et al., 2010).  
In the SQ alternative, no R&D program is launched by the Province of Trento 
and, thus, farmers will control new diseases by spraying new pesticides in 2030. Given 
the very long time-horizon for events to evolve, the number of contaminated apples in 
2030 cannot be known with certainty, thus the SQ looks like a lottery which consists of 
two prospects, Prospect A and B. In Prospect A, there is a given chance P(NA,SQ) that the 
maximum number of contaminated apples in 2030 will be NA,SQ; in Prospect B, there is 
a given chance P(NB,SQ) = 1- P(NA,SQ) that the maximum number of contaminated 
apples in 2030 will be NB,SQ. As any R&D program is implemented, there is no tax to 
pay in the SQ alternative (Table 4.1).  
 
97 
 
Table 4.1 Attribute levels for the SQ 
Attribute Prospect A Prospect B 
Maximum number of apples containing pesticide 
residues in 2030 
NA,SQ  NB,SQ  
Probability of occurrence 
 
P(NA,SQ) 1-P(NA,SQ) 
Yearly tax to pay in the period 2012-2030 
 
0€ 
 
 
As noted above, in addition to the SQ, which allows subjects to reject the other 
alternatives in favor of the baseline scenario, subjects are presented with other two 
alternatives in every choice task. In these alternatives, the Province of Trento will 
launch an R&D program to develop new methods to control new disease in 2030. Such 
methods will reduce the number of apples containing pesticide residues in 2030, as 
compared to the baseline scenario depicted in the SQ alternative. In this case, not only 
the very long time-horizon, but also the uncertainty related to the effectiveness of R&D 
programs, makes an estimate of contaminated apples quite uncertain. Hence, each 
hypothetical alternative presented in each choice task is a lottery which consists of two 
prospects, Prospect A and B. In Prospect A, there is a given chance P(NA,R&D) that the 
maximum number of contaminated apples in 2030 will be NA,R&D; in Prospect B there is 
a given chance P(NB,R&D) =1- P(NA,R&D) that the maximum number of contaminated 
apples in 2030 will be NB,R&D= NB,SQ. As R&D programs will reduce the presence of 
pesticide residues in apples, and, thus NA,R&D<NA,SQ , I have generated three levels for 
NA,R&D by using the pivot approach, and more specifically, the following algorithms, 
NA,SQ – 40%, NA,SQ – 60%, and NA,SQ – 80% (Table 4.2). On the other hand, as the 
effectiveness of R&D programs is highly uncertain, and, thus, P(NA,R&D) ≤P(NA,SQ) and 
1-P(NA,R&D)≥1-P(NA,R&D), I created the pivoted four levels for P(NA,R&D) by using the 
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following algorithms, P(NA,SQ) - 0%,  P(NA,SQ) - 50%, P(NA,SQ) – 80%, and P(NA,SQ) – 
90% (Table 4.2).  
Given that R&D programs are implemented, hypothetical alternatives implies 
that tax-payers of the Province of Trento must pay a specific tax to financially support 
such programs. The selected levels for the tax attribute (T) were the following, 15€, 
30€, 50€, and 80€ (Table 4.2). These levels were determined to be appropriate based on 
previous related studies, as well as taking into account focus group participants' 
opinions and expectations about R&D programs and their costs. 
 
 
Table 4.2 Attribute level for R&D plans 
Attribute Prospect A Prospect B 
Maximum number of apples containing pesticide 
residues in 2030 
NA,SQ – 40% 
NA,SQ – 60% 
NA,SQ – 80% 
NB,SQ 
Probability of occurrence P(NA,SQ) –   0%  
P(NA,SQ) – 50% 
P(NA,SQ) – 80% 
P(NA,SQ) – 90% 
1-[P(NA,SQ) –   0%] 
1-[P(NA,SQ) – 50%] 
1-[P(NA,SQ) – 80%] 
1-[P(NA,SQ) – 90%] 
Yearly tax to pay in the period 2012-2030 15€ 
30€ 
50€ 
80€ 
 
 
In this study, I used a D-efficient homogeneous pivot design that has been 
generated through a two-step procedure. In the first step, by running a pre-test CE 
survey32 prior coefficients of my attributes were estimated, and, then used to generate a 
D-efficient design. Given my 3×42 factorial design of my pre-test study, I have 
                                                          
32The pre-test CE survey was conducted in the period from November 14th and 19th, 2011. The sample 
consists of 80 randomly selected subjects in the Province of Trento. Subjects were interviewed by 
appointment in their own home.  
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generated a simple optimal orthogonal design with four blocks of 9 choice tasks by 
using Ngene 1.1.1. Reference levels and segment weights33 of my homogeneous pivot 
design were obtained by examining the median percentile estimates of the number of 
apples containing pesticide residues in 2030 elicited via the EM by Cerroni et al. 
(2012a)34. A homogeneous pivot design was chosen, rather than a heterogeneous one, 
because the former allows us to generate a single design that can be used for all 
individual-specific SQ alternatives. As subjects face the same experimental design 
whatever treatments they belong to, confounding factors due to the use of different 
designs across treatments are avoided35. The final design was generated again by using 
Ngene 1.1.1.  
 
Experimental treatments and sampling procedure 
The final sample consists of 797 taxpayers who reside in the Province of 
Trento36. Data were collected by trained interviewers using the computer-assisted 
personal interviewed (CAPI) system which consists in face-to-face interviews usually 
conducted at respondents' home or business via a portable personal computer. Data 
obtained from each subject were automatically stored in a central computer. Hour, date 
and place for the interviews were previously arranged by phone calls during which 
interviewers ascertain themselves that subjects were taxpayers living in the Province of 
Trento.  
The Subjective SQ (SSQ) treatment group consists of 487 subjects randomly 
selected from the full sample of 797 people, and the Objective SQ (OSQ) treatment 
                                                          
33Reference levels define the number of individual-specific SQ alternatives, while segment weights define 
the number of subjects that fall in each reference level. Weights are needed to calculate the AVC matrix 
of the design (ChoiceMetrics, 2011).  
34
 This is a quite standard procedure, even though it is not perfect. The best would be to elicit SQ’ 
attribute levels and generate an orthogonal design, then, based on subjects’ choice in each choice task 
progressively generates an efficient pivot design. To my knowledge, this has never been done yet.  
35
 The number of simulate respondents was 500, the number of Halton random draws was 800. 
36
 The survey was conducted in the period between January 24th and March 12th, 2012. 
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group has 310 randomly selected subjects. To ensure comparability across treatments 
the same sampling procedure was used across groups, more specifically, a stratified 
proportional sampling for what concerns age and population of the Province of Trento's 
eleven valleys37.  
In the Subjective SQ, each subject i is presented, with a SQ alternative (No 
R&D Program) which specifies the risk of having contaminated apples in 2030, 
presuming that farmers will control new diseases using chemicals. The risk is elicited 
from her/him by using the exchangeability method. The Subjective SQ consists of a 
lottery containing two risky prospects: in Prospect A, there is a 50% chance that the 
maximum number of contaminated apples in 2030 will be NA,SQ = ai,1/2, the 50th 
percentile estimates of each subject's CDF. In prospect B, there is a 50% chance that the 
maximum number of contaminated apples in 2030 will be NB,SQ = ai,max, the 100th 
percentile estimates of each subject's CDF. Recall that, as the SQ implies that no R&D 
Program will be implemented, there is no tax to pay for subjects (Tables 4.3 and 4.6). 
 
 
Table 4.3 Choice Task 1 for subject i in the SSQ treatment 
 R&D Program X R&D Program Y NO R&D Program 
 Prospect 
A 
Prospect 
B 
Prospect 
A 
Prospect 
B 
Prospect 
A 
Prospect 
B 
Maximum number of 
apples containing 
pesticide residues in 
2030 
ai,1/2–80% ai,max a,1/2-40% ai,max a1/2,i ai,max 
Probability of 
occurrence 
10% 90% 25% 75% 50% 50% 
Yearly tax to pay in the 
period 2012-2030 15€ 50€ 0€ 
                                                          
37
 The Province of Trento is administratively divided in 11 valley communities. 
101 
 
 
In the Objective SQ treatment, each subject i is presented in the SQ alternative, 
with a probability of having contaminated apples in 2030 assuming that farmers will 
control new diseases using chemicals, and this probability differs from the one she/he 
expressed through the EM.  
Subject i was assigned to one treatment subgroup, rather than to the other, based 
on her/his 50th percentile estimate (ai,1/2) that has been previously elicited by using the 
EM. In fact, if subjects i's 50th percentile estimate falls between 76 and 100 apples 
(76≤ai,1/2 ≤100), she/he belongs to the SQLOW treatment, while if it falls between 50 and 
74 apples (50≤ai,1/2 ≤74), she/he belongs to the SQHIGH treatment. 
This “splitting” rule which aims to generate the same sample size across 
subgroups was defined using experimental results by Cerroni et al. (2012a) about the 
number of subjects who have the same 50th percentile estimates of the numbers of 
apples containing pesticides in 2030. The reliability of this approach is supported by the 
fact that both treatment groups consists of 155 subjects. Unfortunately, this procedure 
may have affected the composition of my subsamples which, in this study, should be 
similar across treatment groups, as key socioeconomic variables likely affect 
willingness to pay for R&D programs. Fortunately, having data on these variables 
allows control via additional econometric modeling. To detect variables that must be 
included in the choice models to control their effect on WTP, a very simple logit 
selection model will be run as you will see below.  
In the Objective SQLOW treatment, if subjects i's 50th percentile estimate falls 
between 76 and 86 apples (76≤ai,1/2≤86), the SQ alternative’s prospect A reports that 
there is a 50% chance that the maximum number of contaminated apples in 2030 will be 
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NA,SQ=65, which is lower than 50th percentile estimates of each subject's CDF (ai,1/2), 
while prospect B informs the subject that there is a 50% chance that the maximum 
number of contaminated apples in 2030 will be NB,SQ=75, which is lower than the 100th 
percentile estimates of each subject's CDF (amax,i). In contrast, if subjects i's 50th 
percentile estimate is between 88 and 100 apples (88≤ai,1/2≤100), in Prospect A, 
NA,SQ=75 apples will be contaminated, at the worst, with 50% chance, in Prospect B, 
NB,SQ=85 apples will be contaminated, at the worst, with 50% chance (Table 4.4 and 
4.6).  
 
 
Table 4.4 Choice Task 1 for subject i in the OSQLOW treatment 
 R&D Program X R&D Program Y NO R&D Program 
 Prospect 
A 
Prospect 
B 
Prospect 
A 
Prospect 
B 
Prospect 
A 
Prospect 
B 
Maximum number of 
apples containing 
pesticide residues in 
2030 
65–80% 
or 
75–80% 
75 
or 
85 
65-40% 
or 
75-40% 
75 
or 
85 
65 
or 
75 
75 
or 
85 
Probability of 
occurrence 
10% 90% 25% 75% 50% 50% 
Yearly tax to pay in the 
period 2012-2030 15€ 50€ 0€ 
 
 
In the objective SQHIGH treatment, if subjects i's 50th percentile estimate falls 
between 50 and 66 apples (50≤ai,1/2≤66), Prospect A reports that there is a 50% chance 
that the maximum number of contaminated apples in 2030 will be NA,SQ =75, which is 
higher than 50th percentile estimates of each subject's CDF (ai,1/2), and Prospect B 
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informs that there is a 50% chance that the maximum number of contaminated apples in 
2030 will be NB,SQ=85, which is higher than the 100th percentile estimates of each 
subject's CDF (ai,max). On the other hand, if subjects i's 50th percentile estimate is 
between 68 and 74 apples (68≤ai,1/2≤74), in prospect A, NA,SQ =90 apples will be 
contaminated, at the worst, with 50% chance, in prospect B, NB,SQ = 100 apples will be 
contaminated, at the worst, with 50% chance (Table 4.5 and 4.6)38.  
 
 
Table 4.5 Choice Task 1 for subject i in the OSQHIGH treatment 
 R&D Program X R&D Program Y NO R&D Program 
 Prospect 
A 
Prospect 
B 
Prospect 
A 
Prospect 
B 
Prospect 
A 
Prospect 
B 
Maximum number of 
apples containing 
pesticide residues in 
2030 
75–80% 
or 
90–80% 
85 
or 
100 
75-40% 
or 
90-40% 
85 
or 
100 
75 
or 
90 
85 
or 
100 
Probability of 
occurrence 
10% 90% 25% 75% 50% 50% 
Yearly tax to pay in the 
period 2012-2030 15€ 50€ 0€ 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
38
 Two diverse SQ alternatives were designed for each objective SQ treatment groups because of the deep 
uncertainty surrounding scientific predictions of the number of apples containing pesticides in 2030 in the 
Province of Trento.  
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Table 4.6 Summary statistics 
Summary statistics of variables in the Subjective SQ treatment 
Variable N. Obs. Mean St. Dev Min Max 
SQ R&D SQ R&D SQ R&D SQ R&D SQ R&D 
NA 5,844 5,844 76.480 30.590 6.530 12.813 64 13 98 59 
NB 5,844 5,844 87.188 34.874 9.710 14.863 66 13 100 60 
P(NA) 5,844 5,844 0.5 0.225 0 0.175 0.5 0.05 0.5 0.5 
1-P(NA) 5,844 5,844 0.5 0.775 0 0.175 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.95 
T 5,844 5,844 0 43.750 0 24.337 0 15 0 80 
REDD 5,844 17,012.320 11,103.230 5,000 120,000 
 
Summary statistics of variables in the Objective SQLOW  treatment 
Variable N. Obs. Mean St. Dev Min Max 
SQ R&D SQ R&D SQ R&D SQ R&D SQ R&D 
NA 1,860 1,860 68.290 27.316 4.699 11.338 65 13 75 45 
NB 1,860 1,860 78.290 31.316 4.699 12.948 75 15 85 51 
P(NA) 1,860 1,860 0.5 0.225 0 0.175 0.5 0.05 0.5 0.5 
1-P(NA) 1,860 1,860 0.5 0.775 0 0.175 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.95 
T 1,860 1,860 0 43.750 0 24.341 0 15 0 80 
REDD 1,860 25,870.970 19,022.490 5,000 120,000 
 
Summary statistics of variables in the Objective SQHIGH  treatment 
Variable N. Obs. Mean St. Dev Min Max 
SQ R&D SQ R&D SQ R&D SQ R&D SQ R&D 
NA 1,860 1,860 87.967 35.187 5.134 14.539 75 15 90 54 
NB 1,860 1,860 97.967 39.187 5.134 16.155 85 17 100 60 
P(NA) 1,860 1,860 0.5 0.225 0 0.175 0.5 0.05 0.5 0.5 
1-P(NA) 1,860 1,860 0.5 0.775 0 0.175 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.95 
T 1,860 1,860 0 43.750 0 24.341 0 15 0 80 
REDD 1,860 25,451.610 13,931.760 5,000 120,000 
 
 
Modeling, estimation, and welfare measures 
Selection Model 
To identify variables that affect the composition of my treatment groups, and, 
therefore might potentially influence WTP estimates inferred from my choice models, a 
simple Logit selection model is estimated where the probability of belonging to the SSQ 
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treatment group rather than to the other treatment depends on a set of variables 
indicating the socioeconomic status and attitudes of subjects. This set contains variables 
that the literature in food choices under conditions of risk has shown to be relevant in 
explaining subjects’ behavior such as subjects’ habits that lead to consuming the good 
under study, consumer association membership, family size, being a parent or 
grandparent, and other standard socioeconomic variables such as age, gender, education, 
residence, income and having a life insurance.  
To investigate whether these variables also affect the probability of belonging to 
the OSQLOW rather than to the OSQHIGH treatment group, the equality of logit 
coefficients estimated for both treatment groups is tested by using a Chi Squared Test. 
Individual data about such variables have been elicited by using debriefing questions at 
the end of the survey. All these explanatory variables are described into detail in Table 
4.7. 
 
 
Table 4.7 Summary statistics of variables included in the selection model 
Variable Description N.Obs. Mean St. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
SSQ =1 if the subject belongs to the this 
treatment; 0 = otherwise 
797 0.611 0.487 0 1 
OSQLOW =1 if the subject belongs to the this 
treatment; 0 = otherwise 797 0.194 0.396 0 1 
OSQHIGH =1 if the subject belongs to the this 
treatment; 0 = otherwise 797 0.194 0.396 0 1 
APPLE Number of apples eaten in a week 797 4.500 3.992 0 20 
C_ASS =1 if member of a consumer 
association; 0=otherwise 
797 0.136 0.343 0 1 
PEEL =1 if the subject peels apples before 
eating them; = 0 otherwise   
797 0.438 0.496 0 1 
PROD =1 if apple producer, = 0 otherwise 797 0.100 0.300 0 1 
FAM Number of family members 797 3.504 1.291 1 7 
CHILD =1 if the subject has children, = 0 
otherwise 
797 0.711 0.453 0 1 
GCHILD =1 if the subject has grandchildren, = 0 
otherwise 
797 0.249 0.433 0 1 
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FEM =1 if female, = 0 otherwise 797 0.498 0.500 0 1 
AGE Age in years 797 46.436 14.878 19 75 
SC_PRI = 1 if the respondent have this 
education level;= 0 otherwise 
797 0.326 0.177 0 1 
SC_SEC = 1 if the respondent have this 
education level;= 0 otherwise 
797 0.084 0.277 0 1 
SC_HIGH3 = 1 if the respondent have this 
education level;= 0 otherwise 
797 0.183 0.387 0 1 
SC_HIGH5 = 1 if the respondent have this 
education level;= 0 otherwise 797 0.503 0.500 0 1 
UNI = 1 if the respondent have this 
education level;= 0 otherwise 797 0.168 0.374 0 1 
PHD = 1 if the respondent have this 
education level or higher;= 0 otherwise 797 0.028 0.167 0 1 
INC Yearly net income 797 20,376 14,192 5,000 120,000 
LIFE = 1 if the respondent have a life 
insurance;= 0 otherwise 797 0.166 0.373 0 1 
NON  = 1 if the respondent lives in Non 
Valley;= 0 otherwise 
797 0.115 0.319 0 1 
SOLE = 1 if the respondent lives in Sole 
Valley;= 0 otherwise 797 0.031 0.174 0 1 
GIUD = 1 if the respondent lives in 
Giudicarie Valley;= 0 otherwise 797 0.066 0.249 0 1 
ADIGE = 1 if the respondent lives in Adige 
Valley;= 0 otherwise 797 0.318 0.466 0 1 
GARDA = 1 if the respondent lives in Garda-
Ledro Valley;= 0 otherwise 797 0.083 0.279 0 1 
GRINA = 1 if the respondent lives in 
VallagrinaValley;= 0 otherwise 797 0.160 0.366 0 1 
A_SUG = 1 if the respondent lives in Alta 
Sugana Valley;= 0 otherwise 797 0.095 0.293 0 1 
TESINO = 1 if the respondent lives in 
BassaSugana Valley;= 0 otherwise 797 0.056 0.230 0 1 
FASSA = 1 if the respondent lives in Fassa 
Valley;= 0 otherwise 797 0.020 0.140 0 1 
FIEMME = 1 if the respondent lives in Fiemme 
Valley;= 0 otherwise 797 0.032 0.177 0 1 
PRIM = 1 if the respondent lives in Primiero 
Valley;= 0 otherwise 797 0.018 0.139 0 1 
 
 
Discrete Choice Modeling  
Unlike most CE applications, here, I do not use a standard Random utility model 
(RUMs) which assume that decision makers are certain about their choices. In contrast, 
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as my subjects are asked to make choices over lotteries, I  implement an Expected 
Utility Theory (EUT) driven model which assumes that subject i makes a choice over j 
alternatives, with j = 1,...,J,  by using a utility maximization rule39. Like RUMs, my 
models also assume that the utility that subject i attaches to each alternative j is 
decomposed into two parts, Vi,s,j that is the part of the utility observed by the researcher, 
and εi,s,j  that is the one cannot be observed by the researcher, so that, Ui,j = Vi,j + εi,j. 
While researchers can model Vi,j, they can only make assumptions of the distribution 
that εi,j follows.  
The EUT approach, following von Neuman and Morgenstern (1947), assumes that 
subjects have rational preferences over lotteries L implying risky outcomes xn  with n = 
1,.., N. An outcome is risky when it occurs with a given probability, P(xn)<1, such that 
( ) 1
1
=xP n
N
∑ . Under the EUT (in discrete form), the utility of lottery L is described as 
follows: 
 
Equation 4.1 
 
( ) ( ) ( )nn
N
xU xP=LU ×∑
1
       
     
As described above, in each choice task, each subject i faces three alternatives, 
and, in turn, each alternative j depicts a lottery involving two risky prospects. In 
                                                          
39
 Here, I could refer to EUT when I model choices made in the Objective SQ treatments, where lotteries 
described in choice task's alternatives contain probabilities given by the researchers, thus, objective 
probabilities. In contrast, I could refer to SEUT when I model choices made in the Subjective SQ 
treatments, where the lottery presented in the SQ alternative contains subjective probabilities elicited via 
the exchangeability methods. However, given that lotteries presented  in the other alternatives contain 
probabilities that have been designed on the basis of such elicited probabilities, but are not  purely 
subjective, I prefer to refer to the EUT.  
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Prospect A, there is a probability P(NA,j) that the maximum number of contaminated 
apples in 2030 will be NA,j, and in Prospect B the probability P(NB,j)= 1-P(NA,j) that the 
maximum number of contaminated apples in 2030 will be NB. In each alternative j, 
subject i is asked to pay an annual tax (T), i.e. a tax that is paid in each year 
n={1,…,N}over the period between 2012 and 2030. Each year this tax (T) is taken away 
from each subject’s yearly income (INCi)40, so that, the parameter (INCi – Tj) enters in 
the conditional indirect utility function. Given this framework, the discounted utility 
(Ui,,j) that subject i attaches to alternative j is the sum of the utility that she/he attaches 
to Prospect A (Wi,A,j) and the utility that she/he attaches to Prospect B (Wi,B,j): 
 
Equation 4.2 
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40
 I assume the income to be constant over the period between 2012 and 2030. 
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In the model presented above, the parameter β0 is the alternative specific constant 
related to each alternative j. As it is evident in Equation 4.3 and 4.4, I investigate the 
presence of an unobserved between-subject heterogeneity for the coefficient βN,i. After 
having tested diverse distributional forms (normal, lognormal, SB Johnson), the 
triangular distribution was chosen to model this random parameter. To my knowledge, 
only a few CE studies have modeled a random parameter related to risky outcomes. 
Glenk and Colombo (2011) investigated the risk of failure of environmental policies 
aiming to store carbon dioxide in the soil, and, in a second study, by Hensher and Li 
(2012) the risk of being late for a trip is considered, and both studies allow for some 
heterogeneity in the model via a random parameter. Interestingly, both previous studies 
also used a constrained triangular distribution for their random parameter 
distributions41. 
The r parameters included in the modeling, rN and rINC, generally measure the 
utility function’s curvature, and, in my EUT framework, these terms correspond to 
coefficients of constant relative risk aversion (CRRA). Linear-in-income specifications 
assume all subjects are risk neutral, which might not be desirable in modeling. Recently, 
risk attitudes have been empirically shown to be context-dependent (Riddel, 
forthcoming), hence, I estimated two different CRRA coefficient here, one for the 
contaminated apple outcome (rN) and the other for the income outcome (rINC). 
Otherwise, the usual assumption is that risk preferences are consistent across sources of 
risk. More specifically, the parameter rA accounts for a subject’s risk attitude with 
respect to the number of contaminated apples in our fruit bowls in 2030, while the 
parameter rINC represents the subjects’ risk attitudes with respect to income. The CRRA 
                                                          
41
 I did not need to constrain my triangular distributions as we did not have the issue of having some risk 
parameter positive.  
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coefficient’s specification used in my model has been extensively implemented in 
economic experiments investigating risk attitudes or preferences for monetary or 
financial outcomes (e.g. Andersen et al., 2006; 2008). To my knowledge, only Glenk 
and Colombo (2011), and Hensher and Li (2012) have already incorporated the CRRA 
specification I used here to model utility functions in CE studies. Others take into 
account the utility function’s curvature by incorporating exponential or log 
specifications of the monetary/income attribute (Cameron, 2005a; Riddel and Shaw, 
2006). 
As noted above, my subjects are asked to pay a yearly tax in the period between 
2012 and 2030, and thus, my model incorporates a standard financial rate of discount, δ. 
The estimated coefficient of this parameter provides a measure of the discount rate that 
subjects used in their temporally dependent choices (e.g., Burghart et al., 2007).  
The vector Yi,j consists of all socioeconomic and variables that the estimated 
selection model has shown to affect the composition of treatment group. They are 
incorporated in the model to control their potential influence on subjects’ choice-
behavior and, hence, on their MWTP estimates. To create differences in utilities over 
alternatives, each of these variables is normalized to zero when it is associated to the SQ 
alternative (Train, 2003). More specifically, these variables indicate subject’s apple 
consumption habit (APPLES), consumer association membership (C_ASS), job typology 
(PROD), age (AGE), gender (FEMALE), and life insurance taker (LIFE).  
 
Estimation procedure and welfare measures 
As noted above, in each choice task, subjects are asked to state their best and least 
preferred alternatives in a set of three alternatives j, say j1, j2, and j3. Such a preference 
elicitation procedure allows me to obtain a full ranking of the alternatives from the best 
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preferred to the least preferred, for example, if subject i chooses j1 as the best preferred 
and j3 as the least preferred alternative, I might assume that, to subject i’s first, second, 
and third best are j1, j2, and j3, respectively. Given that, I might assume that subject i 
made her/his chooses sequentially, in the sense that she/he first chooses j1 in asset of 
three alternatives {j1, j2, j3}, and then, she/he chooses the alternative j2 in a set 
containing the remaining two alternatives {j2, j3}. Assuming this decision-making 
procedure, I have estimate models presented above by using a standard “exploded” 
MMNL, where the probability of occurrence of each ranking option is obtained as 
follows:  
 
Equation 4.5 
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In my investigation, for risk reduction related to the presence of pesticide residues 
in apples MWTP are estimated using the following specification, which of course 
follows from marginal rates of substitution: 
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This specification implies that the MWTP for risk reduction is the following: 
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Results 
Selection Model  
Results obtained from both the estimation of my logit selection model and the 
related Chi Squared Test suggest that the composition of the SSQ treatment group 
differs from that of the other treatment groups. In fact,  the probability of belonging to 
the SSQ treatment rather than to the other treatment groups depends on several 
socioeconomics and attitudinal variables. In contrast, the probability of belonging to the 
OSQLOW rather than to the OSQHIGH treatment is affected by only a few key parameters 
(Table 4.8 and 4.9).   
Specifically, subjects who consume many apples (APPLE), have large families 
(FAM), and have large incomes (INC) more likely belong to the OSQLOW and OSQHIGH 
rather than to the SSQ treatment than the others. In contrast, parents (CHILD) and life 
insurance takers (LIFE) more likely belong to the SSQ treatment than to the others. 
Note that parents (CHILD) have a higher probability of belonging to the OSQHIGH rather 
than to the OSQLOW.  Older subjects (AGE), grandparents (GCHILD), and high educated 
subjects (SC_SEC, SC_HIGH3, SC_HIGH5, UNI, PHD) more likely belong to the 
OSQLOW rather than to the SSQ treatment than the others. All the coefficients on these 
key variables are statistically significant (Table 4.8 and 4.9).  Other variables barely 
affect the composition of my treatment groups (Table 4.8 and 4.9).  
Note that these differences would prove fatal in a conventional experiment that 
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uses ANOVA tests of differences between randomly assigned treatment groups, but, 
here econometric models are used to additionally control for these influences. 
 
Table 4.8 Logit Selection model 
Baseline: SSQ OSQLOW OSQHIGH 
Variable Coefficient St. error Coefficient St. error 
APPLE 0.210*  (0.031) 0.220* (0.032) 
C_ASS -0.113 (0.338) -0.270 (0.398) 
PEEL -0.331 (0.229) -0.012 (0.226) 
PROD 0.246 (0.384) 0.055 (0.453) 
FAM 0.346* (0.098) 0.474* (0.099) 
CHILD -1.406* (0.320) -0.583*** (0.317) 
GCHILD 1.271* (0.346) 0.320 (0.363) 
FEM 0.235 (0.227) 0.104 (0.224) 
AGE 0.024** (0.011) 0.018 (0.012) 
SC_PRI - - - - 
SC_SEC 3.226** (1.503) 15.689 (1031.826) 
SC_HIGH3 3.410** (1.472) 14.973 (1031.826) 
SC_HIGH5 3.987* (1.479) 16.136 (1031.826) 
UNI 4.710* (1.506) 16.751 (1031.826) 
PHD 4.152** (1.621) 16.713 (1031.826) 
INC 0.001* (0.001) 0.001* (0.001) 
LIFE -0.973* (0.349) -1.570* (0.407) 
NON  - - - - 
SOLE 0.581 (0.642) 0.474 (0.815) 
GIUD -2.472** (1.080) 1.161** (0.563) 
ADIGE 0.245 (0.372) 0.451 (0.481) 
GARDA -0.103 (0.484) 0.558 (0.566) 
GRINA -0.099 (0.437) 0.706 (0.519) 
A_SUG -1.571** (0.641) 0.785 (0.534) 
TESINO -1.354 (0.839) 1.542* (0.588) 
FASSA 0.899 (0.718) -15.772 (1616.718) 
FIEMME -0.190 (0.649) -0.521 (0.926) 
PRIM -16.068 (1545.315) 1.276*** (0.769) 
CONS -8.733* (1.678) -22.112 (1031.458) 
LL -544.123 
PSEUDO R2 0.250 
*1% significance level; **5% significance level; ***10% significant level 
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Table 4.9 Chi Squared Test for comparing coefficients of the OSQLOW 
and the OSQHIGH treatments 
Null Hypothesis (H0) χ2 
APPLE(OSQLOW)= APPLE(OSQHIGH) 0.460 
C_ASS(OSQLOW)= C_ASS(OSQHIGH) 0.150 
PEEL(OSQLOW)= PEEL(OSQHIGH) 1.440 
PROD(OSQLOW)= PROD(OSQHIGH) 0.180 
FAM(OSQLOW)= FAM(OSQHIGH) 1.131 
CHILD(OSQLOW)= CHILD(OSQHIGH) 5.370** 
GCHILD(OSQLOW)= GCHILD(OSQHIGH) 5.890** 
FEM(OSQLOW)= FEM(OSQHIGH) 0.240 
AGE(OSQLOW)= AGE(OSQHIGH) 0.240 
SC_PRIM(OSQLOW)= SC_PRIM(OSQHIGH) - 
SC_SEC(OSQLOW)= SC_SEC(OSQHIGH) 0.000 
SC_HIGH3(OSQLOW)= SC_HIGH3(OSQHIGH) 0.000 
SC_HIGH5(OSQLOW)= SC_HIGH5(OSQHIGH) 0.000 
UNI(OSQLOW)= UNI(OSQHIGH) 0.000 
PHD(OSQLOW)= PHD(OSQHIGH) 0.000 
INC(OSQLOW)= INC(OSQHIGH) 0.020 
LIFE(OSQLOW)= LIFE (OSQHIGH) 1.790 
NON(OSQLOW)= NON(OSQHIGH) - 
SOLE(OSQLOW)= SOLE(OSQHIGH) 0.020 
GIUD(OSQLOW)= GIUD(OSQHIGH) 10.390*** 
ADIGE(OSQLOW)= ADIGE(OSQHIGH) 0.180 
GARDA(OSQLOW)= GARDA(OSQHIGH) 1.230 
GRINA(OSQLOW)= GRINA(OSQHIGH) 2.230 
A_SUG(OSQLOW)= A_SUG(OSQHIGH) 10.990*** 
TESINO(OSQLOW)= TESINO(OSQHIGH) 10.900*** 
FASSA(OSQLOW)= FASSA(OSQHIGH) 0.000 
FIEMME(OSQLOW)= FIEMME(OSQHIGH) 0.130 
PRIM(OSQLOW)= PRIM(OSQHIGH) 0.000 
CONS(OSQLOW)= CONS(OSQHIGH) 0.000 
*1% significance level; **5% significance level; ***10% significant 
level 
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Discrete choice models 
By using a mixed multinomial logit (MMNL) estimation procedure, three 
discounted Expected Utility Theory (EUT) models are estimated, one for each treatment 
group, the Subjective SQ (SSQ model), the Objective Low SQ (OSQLOW model), and 
the Objective High SQ (OSQLOW model). 
As a quick preview of my estimation’s results, I first note that my models perform 
better when applied to subjects who belong to the SSQ treatment rather than to the 
sample members of  the OSQ ones. In fact, while the SSQ model provides coefficients 
which are in line with findings from previous empirical studies, the other models do not. 
This may suggest that subjective probabilities are better predictors of subjects’ choices 
than probability estimates provided by researchers. This may be due to the fact that, 
when subjects are provided with SQ’s probability measures which differ from expected 
ones, they adjust the former on the latter (Table 4.10). 
In all the specifications, coefficients of alternative specific constants related to 
R&D programs x and y (βASC_R&Dx and βASC_R&Dy) are positive and statistically 
significant. As R&D programs are generic and unlabelled, these coefficients do not 
diverge much within the same model, although βASC_R&Dx is always barely greater than 
βASC_R&Dy (Table 4.10). This result suggests that subjects consistently prefer R&D 
programs rather than the SQ alternative, even when they are presented with a pivot 
experimental design tailored on their expectations. Many transportation studies have 
shown that pivot CEs induce subjects to prefer the SQ rather than other alternatives 
(scenario rejection or status quo effect). This phenomenon is likely due to the fact that 
SQ is based on their experience, while other hypothetical alternatives do not (i.e., they 
are designed by the researcher) (Hess and Rose, 2009). Now, given that SQ alternatives 
in my pivot CE are not designed on real experience, but on probabilistic expectations 
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about future outcomes, subjects likely perceive the SQ as much hypothetical as the 
other alternatives, and, hence, they do not have any reason to systematically prefer the 
SQ.  
In my modeling, I investigate the presence of unobserved between-subject 
heterogeneity in the coefficient of the variable N (βN) which indicates the number of 
contaminated apples in 2030. Unobserved heterogeneity is detected in all the models. 
The estimated mean (βNµ)  of such distribution is always negative and statistically 
significant, while the estimated standard deviation (βNσ)  is always lower than the 
estimated mean, indicating that each subject’s N parameter is negative (Table 4.10). This 
means that the probability of choosing one alternative rather than the others increases 
when the number of contaminated apples decreases. However, as the impact of the 
variable N on subjects’ choices in the OSQ models is much lower than in the SSQ 
model, I conclude that when subjects are presented with SQ’s risk levels that diverge 
from their expected ones, the models have a relatively low explanatory power (Table 
4.10). 
The coefficient of the term INC-TAX  (βINC) indicates the net yearly income: the 
annual income left after having paid the yearly tax in the period between 2012 and 2030 
for having a R&D program. The yearly income remains intact if the SQ is chosen. 
Estimated coefficients are negative and statistically in all specifications, and, thus, the 
probability of choosing an alternative increases when the amount of money to pay 
decreases (Table 4.10).  
In all the models, the coefficient rN is negative and statistically significant, 
meaning that subjects are overall risk loving with respect to the number of contaminated 
apples. Specifically, subjects who belong to the SSQ are moderately risk-loving in the 
SSQ (rN= -0.535), while others are extremely risk loving (rN= -2.410 in the OSQLOW and 
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(rN= -3.550 in the OSQHIGH model). The information given by the researcher in the SQ 
alternative appears to have a huge impact on subjects’ risk preferences (Table 4.10). 
This result is consistent with previous empirical studies which have shown that the way 
of framing outcomes of a gamble strongly affects subjects’ risk preferences. In 
particular, if outcomes are framed as a loss, subjects becomes risk seeking, while, if 
outcomes are framed as gains subjects are risk averse (e.g., Kahneman and Tversy, 
1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1981; Kanheman and Tversky, 1984). In this application, 
the fact that attribute N is clearly framed as a loss (number of contaminated apples out 
of 100 apples) likely induces subjects to “seek” the health risk: i.e., they prefer riskier 
gambles in this dimension42.  
The coefficient rINC is positive and statistically significant, meaning that subjects 
are overall risk averse with respect to the income. All subjects are moderately risk 
averse in income, whatever group treatment they belong to (rINC=0.297 in the SSQ, 
rINC=0.054 in the OSQLOW, and  rINC=0.197 in the OSQHIGH model) (Table 4.10).  
The coefficient δ that indicates the financial discount factor that subjects use 
during their choices, is statistically significant only in the SSQ model (δ =0.460). This 
suggests that subjects in the SSQ treatment groups have a discount factor of about 46%, 
while, on average, other subjects have a discount factor which is not significantly 
different from zero (Table 4.10)43.  
Other socioeconomic and attitudinal variables that influence subjects’ choice-
behavior and, hence, their MWTP estimates were incorporated in the models to control 
for potential differences in the subsamples. Those variables only partially affect 
subjects’ choice behavior.  
                                                          
42
 It is likely that if the random variable under study was the number of free-pesticide apples (gain), then, 
subjects were risk averse. 
43
 It is quite possible that for long-term decisions, the average person’s discount rate is in fact close to 
zero, meaning that they value the future the same as the present. 
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More specifically, my results indicate that apple consumers and members of 
consumer associations more likely agree to pay for R&D programs when they are 
presented with their probability estimates in the SSQ (positive and statistically 
significant signs for APPLES and C_ASS), however, they more likely refuse R&D 
programs and, thus, they stuck on the SQ when they face a risk information which is not 
consistent with their expectations (negative and statistically significant signs for 
APPLES and C_ASS) (Table 4.10). Apple producers are consistently reluctant to pay for 
the implementation of R&D programs in all specifications (negative and statistically 
significant signs for PROD) (Table 4.10). This may be due to the fact that they perceive 
pesticides to be more efficient controls than microorganisms or resistant varieties in 
handling apples disease.  
Gender affects choices in SSQ model but not in the others, in particular women 
are less willing to financially support R&D programs then men (negative and 
statistically significant sign for FEMALE). In contrast, elderly subjects’ choices appear 
to be motivated by something like altruism towards future generations, in fact, they are 
more willing to pay for R&D programs than young subjects, at least in the OSQ models 
(positive and statistically significant sign for AGE) (Table 4.10). Having a life insurance 
policy may be an indicator of risk preferences, but barely affect subjects’ choices (Table 
4.10)44. Although all potential variables that might affect food choices, according to the 
related literature, are incorporated in the modeling,  the discrepancy in behavior might 
be still affected by my failure to identify omitted variables.   
 
 
 
                                                          
44
 Variables indicating family size, children age, education and residence were introduced in the models, 
but they did not significantly affect choice-behavior at all.  
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Table 4.10 Mixed Multinomial Logit estimation of discounted 
EUT models 
 SSQ OSQLOW OSQHIGH 
ASC_R&DX 0.318* 
(0.106) 
0.632** 
(0.314) 
1.54* 
(0.222) 
ASC_R&DY 0.278* 
(0.0928) 
0.546*** 
(0.276) 
1.28* 
(0.187) 
N_µa -0.0014* 
(3.22e-05) 
-2.07e-6* 
(4.80e-08) 
-8.85e-08* 
(2.04e-09) 
N_σa 0.0007* 
(0.000206) 
1.72e-06* 
(2.05e-07) 
-1.81e-09* 
(1.22e-10) 
rN -0.535* 
(0.0822) 
-2.410* 
(0.109) 
-3.550* 
(0.0139) 
INC 0.257* 
(0.0951) 
0.036*** 
(0.0211) 
0.209** 
(0.103) 
rINC 0.297* 
(0.0185) 
0.054*** 
(0.0351) 
0.197*** 
(0.0493) 
δ 0.460** 
(0.219) 
0.919 
(0.793) 
6.91 
(1.80e+308) 
APPLEX 0.076* 
(0.0117) 
-0.150* 
(0.0163) 
-0.220* 
(0.0186) 
APPLEY 0.080* 
(0.0115) 
-0.148* 
(0.0149) 
-0.194* 
(0.0170) 
T_CONX 0.344* 
(0.0874) 
-0.228 
(0.156) 
-0.322 
(0.206) 
T_CONY 0.309* 
(0.0849) 
-0.294*** 
(0.156) 
-0.488* 
(0.142) 
PRODX -1.12e-05* 
(1.62e-06) 
-1.76e-05*** 
(2.88e-06) 
-1.11e-5** 
(5.29e-06) 
PRODY -1.24e-05* 
(1.80e-06) 
-1.66e-05* 
(2.95e-06) 
-8.80e-6 
(5.63e-06) 
GENDERX -0.150* 
(0.0558) 
-0.074 
(0.110) 
-0.233 
(0.142) 
GENDERY -0.250* 
(0.0560) 
-0.108 
(0.107) 
-0.135*** 
(0.0727) 
AGEX -0.001 
(0.000254) 
0.008** 
(0.00396) 
0.008** 
(0.00394) 
AGEY -0.001 
(0.000317) 
0.010* 
(0.00392) 
0.005 
(0.00373) 
LIFEX 0.335 
(0.0740) 
0.383** 
(0.171) 
-1.71 
(1.80e+308) 
LIFEY 0.267 
(0.0743) 
0.259 
(0.168) 
-0.488* 
(0.142) 
LL(0) -10,471.042 -3,332.673 -3,332.673 
LL(β) -8,399.744 -2,471.542 -2,700.016 
Rho 0.198 0.258 0.190 
N 11,688 3,720 3,720 
*1% significance level; **5% significance level; ***10% significant level 
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Willingness to pay 
Mean yearly MWTP estimates (per taxpayer) for a marginal reduction in the risk 
of having contaminated apples in 2030 are estimated for each treatment group by using 
the formula in Equation 4.7 presented above45. This equation implies that MWTP 
estimates depend on both the number of apples containing pesticides in 2030 (NA,R&D 
and NB,R&D) and the probability of this amount occurring (PA,R&D and PB,R&D) presented 
in the risky prospects of R&D programs. In their turn, as a pivot experimental design is 
used, NA,R&D, NB,R&D, PA,R&D, and PB,R&D depend on the SQ alternative that each subject 
faces, specifically, on both the number of apples containing pesticides in 2030 (NA,SQ 
and NB,SQ) and the probability of this amount occurring (PA,SQ and PB,SQ). Finally, 
MWTP estimates also depend on both each subject’s yearly income (INCi)and the yearly 
tax to pay in order to get the R&D program implemented (TR&D). 
Given this framework, several MWTP calculations can be undertaken. However, I 
focus on those which allow me to investigate the scenario adjustment by testing 
Hypothesis 1 and 2 presented above. In particular, I only estimate MWTP that are 
comparable across treatment groups, more specifically, MWTP that relates to SQ 
alternatives which present subjects with the same risky prospects whatever treatment 
group they belong to. More specifically, I have estimated MWTP related to the 
following SQ alternatives: SSQ(65-50%,75-50%), OSQLOW(65-50%,75-50%), SSQ(75-50%,85-50%), 
OSQLOW(75-50%,85-50%), OSQHIGH(75-50%,75-50%),  SSQ(90-50%,100-50%), and, finally, OSQHIGH(90-
50%,100-50%). For example, the SSQ(65-50%,75-50%) is the estimate from subjects who belong 
to the SSQ treatment group and face a SQ alternative in which there is 50% chance to 
have 65 contaminated apples (Prospect A) and 50% chance to have 75 contaminated 
apples (Prospect B) (Table 4.11). 
                                                          
45
 MWTP is constant over time, and, hence, can be aggregated over time. 
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Given the fact that MWTP estimates depend also on the risk reduction that each 
R&D program produces, here, MWTP are inferred about 4 different risk reduction 
scenarios out of the 12 available for each selected SQ alternative. These reduction 
scenarios are the following:  
i. NA,SQ – 40% with PA,SQ -90%, and NB,SQ with 1-(PA,SQ -90%) 
ii. NA,SQ – 40% with PA,SQ -0% chance, and NB,SQ with 1-(PA,SQ -0%) 
iii. NA,SQ – 80% with PA,SQ -90%, and NB,SQ with 1-(PA,SQ -90%) 
iv. NA,SQ – 80% with PA,SQ -0% chance, and NB,SQ with 1-(PA,SQ -0%) 
 
For example, considering the SSQ(65-50%,75-50%) these risk reductions are:  
i. 39 bad apples with 5% chance, and 75 bad apples
 
with 95% chance 
ii. 39 bad apples with 50% chance, and 75 bad apples
 
with 50% chance 
iii. 13 bad apples with 5% chance, and 75 bad apples
 
with 95 chance 
iv. 13 bad apples with 50% chance, and 75 bad apples
 
with 50% chance 
 
Finally, because MWTP estimates involve an income effect, the estimates are 
assessed by assuming that the average or typical subject has a yearly income equal to 
€50,000 and that the R&D program yearly costs €30.  
Inferred yearly MWTP estimates per taxpayer are quite reasonable. The MWTP 
ranges from €0.01 to €1.39 in the  SSQ treatment, from €0.17 to €2.79 in the OSQLOW, 
and from €1.26 to €24.97 in the OSQHIGH (Table 4.11). A previous study  which has 
investigated subjects’ preferences for reducing health risks due to pesticide residues in 
Northern Italy, has found a MTWP per household per month of about €0.48 (lower 
bound €0.01 and upper bound €0.87) (Travisi and Nijkamp, 2008).   
In each treatment, when the number of contaminated apples increases in the 
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prospects of the SQ  alternative, then MWTP estimate for a given risk reduction 
increases. For example, MWTP of a subjected presented with SSQ(90,100) for a risk 
reduction i (equal to 0.139) is greater than MWTP of a subject who faces SSQ(75,85) 
(equal to 0.126) (Table 4.11). 
Second, in each treatment, when the probability of a given reduction in the 
number of contaminated apples increases, then MWTP increases. For example, MWTP 
of a subject presented with SSQ(65-50%,75-50%) for a risk reduction ii (equal to 0.179) is 
greater than  that for a risk reduction i (equal to 0.116) (Table 4.11). 
Third, in each treatment, when the reduction in the number of contaminated 
apples increases, being the probability of the reduction constant, then MWTP decreases. 
For example, MWTP of a subject who face SSQ(65-50%,75-50%) for a risk reduction i (equal 
to 0.179) is greater than that
 for a risk reduction iii (equal to 0.096) (Table 4.11). This is 
due to the fact the subjects are risk loving with respect to the number of contaminated 
apples. 
 
 
Table 4.11 Marginal willingness to pay for risk reductions  
SQ NA,SQ-40%    0.05 
NB,SQ                  0.95 
NA,SQ-40%    0.50 
NB,SQ                  0.50 
NA,SQ-80%    0.05 
NB,SQ                  0.95 
NA,SQ-80%    0.50 
NB,SQ                  0.50 
SSQ(65-50%,75-50%) 0.118 1.179 0.096 0.963 
OSQLOW(65-50%,75-50%) 0.204 2.048 0.172 1.720 
     
SSQ(75-50%,85-50%) 0.126 1.265 0.103 1.032 
OSQLOW(75-50%,85-50%) 0.278 2.787 0.232 2.237 
OSQHIGH(75-50%,85-50%) 1.392 13.928 1.263 12.636 
     
SSQ(90-50%,100-50%) 0.139 1.385 0.113 1.129 
OSQHIGH(90-50%,100-50%) 2.497 24.971 2.250 22.504 
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Hypothesis testing 
Hypothesis 1 is tested by comparing MWTP inferred from subjects who face  
SSQ(65-50%,75-50%), OSQLOW(65-50%,75-50%), SSQ(75-50%,85-50%), OSQLOW(75-50%,85-50%). On the 
other hand, Hypothesis 2 is tested by comparing MWTP inferred from subjects 
presented with SSQ(75-50%,85-50%), OSQHIGH(75-50%,75-50%),  SSQ(90-50%,100-50%), and, finally, 
OSQHIGH(90-50%,100-50%). My hypotheses are tested by using a simple t-test (Table 4.12).  
Testing Hypothesis 1, I reject the null hypothesis that MWTPs for given risk 
reductions provided by subjects who expected SQ’s risk levels equal to those presented 
in the SQ (SSQ treatment) are higher than or equal to MWTP estimates inferred from 
subjects who expected SQ’s risk levels higher than those given in the SQ (OSQLOW 
treatment) (at the 1% significance level). I conclude that subjects do not fully accept the 
information given in the SQ, but they positively adjust this on what they expected. 
Subjects in the OSQLOW treatment group make choices by using a risk of having 
contaminated apples greater than the risk used by subjects in the SSQ
 
treatment, and, 
hence, the former group has higher MWTP for risk reductions than the latter group. 
These results are consistent across diverse risk reductions (Table 4.12).  
By testing Hypothesis 2, I fail to reject the null hypothesis that MWTP estimates 
for risk reductions inferred from subjects who expected SQ’s risk levels equal to those 
given in the SQ (SSQ
 
treatment ) are lower than or equal to those obtained from subjects 
who expected SQ’s risk levels smaller than those presented in the SQ (OSQHIGH 
treatment) (Table 4.12). In this case, I expected subjects who adjust the information 
provided in the SQ on their expectations (OSQ
 
treatment) to have lower MWTP for risk 
reductions than the others. In fact, subjects should negatively adjust the information 
given in the SQ, on their expectations. In contrast, subjects who belong to the OSQHIGH 
treatment have higher MWTP than the others. Such a result is consistent across diverse 
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risk reductions (Table 4.12). I might speculate that, when subjects find in the SQ risk of 
having contaminated apples substantially higher that they expected, they might feel 
some sort of alarm that induce them to irrationally pay more than what they would have 
paid if this information was not given. This would be consistent with the alarmist 
learning theory by Viscusi and Magat (1992). 
 
 
Table 4.12 One sided t test for comparing marginal willingness to pay 
H0 NA,SQ-40% 0.05 
NB,SQ                0.95 
NA,SQ-40% 0.50 
NB,SQ                0.50 
NA,SQ-80% 0.05 
NB,SQ                0.95 
NA,SQ-80% 0.50 
NB,SQ                0.50 
MWTP_ SSQ(65-50%,75-50%) 
≥ 
MWTP_ OSQLOW(65-50%,75-50%) 
-368.392*** -369.561*** -385.725*** -383.320*** 
MWTP_ SSQ(75-50%,85-50%) 
≥ 
MWTP_OSQLOW(75-50%,85-50%) 
-487.493*** -487.225*** -497.112*** -499.776*** 
MWTP_ SSQ(75-50%,85-50%) 
≤ 
MWTP_ OSQHIGH(75-50%,85-50%) 
-12,999.920 -12,991.150 -14,327.540 -14,324.360 
MWTP_SSQ(90-50%,100-50%) 
≤ 
MWTP_ OSQHIGH(90-50%,100-50%) 
-19,730.590 -19,736.340 -21,247.120 -21,183.070 
*1% significance level; **5% significance level; ***10% significant level 
 
Conclusions 
In this essay, I investigated to what extent the scenario adjustment occurs in 
choice experiments by using an innovative two-stage approach that relies on the 
comparison of willingness-to-pay estimates obtained in different treatment groups. In 
the first, subjects are presented with a status quo alternative where the risk of having 
contaminated apples in 2030 is consistent with their subjective estimates, while, in the 
second, they are presented with a status quo alternative where the risk of having 
contaminated apples in 2030 is not consistent with their probability estimates.  
To implement this approach, I incorporated subjective probabilities, elicited via a 
novel approach such as the exchangeability method, into my choice experiment’s design 
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by using a pivot experimental design. As previous stated-preference investigations have 
only introduced subjective probability estimates in econometric modeling, but never 
into their choice context designs, this investigation introduces a new way to investigate 
the role of subjective probabilities on choice behavior.  
My discounted Expected Utility Theory model predicts choice behavior of 
subjects who belong to the first group quite well, while it poorly explains choices of 
subjects who belong to the second groups. This highlights that subjective probabilities 
strongly affect the decisions under conditions of risk, and that risk information has a 
strong impact on choice behavior.  
I found that subjects when provided with risk that are lower than perceived ones, 
adjust attribute levels on their expectations, and express marginal willingness to pay for 
risk reduction higher than those that they would have provided taking choices by using 
status quo’s risk information. In contrast, subjects who face a risk of having 
contaminated apples higher than the expected one, do not negatively adjust attribute 
levels on their expectations, but, they, driven by some sort of panic, overreact to this 
information and irrationally pay more than what they would have paid if they fully 
accepted the SQ’s information.  
My investigation has shown that information provided by researchers in the 
status quo alternative substantially affects subjects’ choices. This might have very 
crucial policy implication, in the sense that financial support for public policies might 
be driven by the strategy used to communicate new information, in this case risk 
information.  This is not necessarily a bad thing, for example, stated-preference studies 
might become very helpful in identifying the most effective way to communicate risk 
information that makes people willing to support policies that are not perceived to be 
important yet. 
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CHAPTER V. CONCLUSIONS 
My dissertation has considered the influence of subjective probabilities on choice-
behavior, in particular, the influence that subjective probabilities of having 
contaminated apples have on preferences for R&D programs that will improve apple 
safety in the future. 
This work has contributed to the literature in food choices in two ways. First, an 
innovative indirect elicitation technique such as the Exchangeability Method (EM) has 
been used to elicit probabilities related to food outcomes. Unlike direct elicitation 
techniques, commonly used to investigate subjective probabilities in stated-preference 
studies, the EM does not ask subjects to express the probability that given outcomes will 
occur in the future, but infers probability estimates at the point for which subjects 
become indifferent to bet a certain amount of money on a given outcome rather than on 
an alternative one. In particular, the main EM’s advantage is that it does not force 
individuals to process numerical probability estimates. The presumed superiority of this 
elicitation technique has been explored by testing the internal validity of subjective 
probabilities elicited via the EM in an artefactual field experiment.  
Second, subjective probabilities have been incorporated in the experimental 
design of a stated-choice technique to test to what extent subject adjust the risk 
information provided by researchers in the status quo alternative on their probabilistic 
expectations. This dissertation has represented the first attempt to incorporate subjective 
probabilities into the design of stated-choice experiments to investigate subjects’ 
behavior under conditions of risk.  
In the first essay, experimental results suggest that the EM is not necessarily 
incentive compatible because chained questions might induce subjects to strategically 
behave when associated with monetary incentives. In addition, results show that 
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incentive compatibility determines the validity of subjective probabilities elicited via 
the EM. In fact, subjects are more likely to provide valid subjective probabilities when 
they are rewarded with real monetary incentives and presented with experimental 
designs where the chaining is hidden through a particular randomization of the 
questions.  
In the second essay, my experimental results show that valid subjective 
probabilities elicited via the EM do not significantly diverge from invalid ones, and, 
hence, internal validity does not affect the actual magnitude of subjective probabilities. 
This suggests that failure to recognize validity does not imply an over- or 
underestimation of consumers’ probability estimates. 
In the third essay, the occurrence of the scenario adjustment was detected by using 
an innovative approach which implies the incorporation of subjective probabilities into 
the design of my CE. Results suggest that when subjects are provided with risk levels 
that are lower than their subjective estimates, they adjust the former on the latter, and 
provide marginal willingness to pay estimates that are higher than those that they would 
have provided under fully acceptance of the status quo alternative. In contrast, when 
subjects are presented with status quo alternative in which risk levels are higher than 
their subjective estimates, they do not negatively adjust the former on the latter, but, 
motivated by a sense of alarm, they overreact to such an information and provide 
marginal willingness to pay estimates that are greater than the ones they would have 
expressed if they fully accepted the status quo scenario. The latter result is in line with 
the alarmist learning theory developed by Viscusi and Magat (1992). These results 
might have very interesting policy implications as they suggest that stated preference 
investigations might be used to identify risk communication strategies that efficiently 
inform subjects about the true magnitude of risks. 
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APPENDIX A 
Example 1.  First question of the Exchangeability Game for the variable g 
I prefer to bet 100€ on the fact that the number of days of April in which the fire 
blight infestation will occur with certainty in 2030 is: 
 
 
 
 
a ga={g0 + [(g1-g0)/2]} 
 
 
 
Example 2.  First question of the Repeated Exchangeability Game Test for the 
variable g1/2’  
I prefer to bet 100€ on the fact that the number of days of April in which the fire 
blight infestation will occur with certainty in 2030 is: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
□ □ 
smaller than gaa greater than or equal to  gaa 
□ □ 
greater than  g1/4 
and  
smaller than g1/2 
greater than or equal to g1/2 
and 
smaller than  g3/4 
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Example 3.  A question of the Certainty Equivalent Game for g1/2  
In each of the following question, do you prefer to play the lottery presented in 
Option A or do you prefer to take the amount of money presented in Option? 
 
 
In each of the following question, do you prefer to play the lottery presented in 
Option A or do you prefer to take the amount of money presented in Option? 
 
 
 
 
Option A Option B 
You win 100€  if the number of days of April in which 
the fire blight infestation will occur with certainty in 
2030 is SMALLER THAN g1/2 
 
0€, otherwise 
□ □ 0€ 
□ □ 25€ 
□ □ 49€ 
□ □ 51€ 
□ □ 75€ 
□ □ 100€ 
Option A Option B 
You win 100€  if the number of days of April in which 
the fire blight infestation will occur with certainty in 
2030 is GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO g1/2 
 
0€, otherwise 
□ □ 0€ 
□ □ 25€ 
□ □ 49€ 
□ □ 51€ 
□ □ 75€ 
□ □ 100€ 
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APPENDIX B 
Let ijG  be disjoint events with i = {1,.., n} and j = n and SG be a sample space, 
then:  
Statement 1. ( ) 1=GSP           
Consider the sample space SG, I impose that SG = 11G  = 1 by telling respondents 
that the probability associated to the entire sample space is equal to 1, say SG = 11G  
= 1.             
Statement 2. ( ) 0≥ijGP  
Consider ( )12GP  and ( )22GP , I impose that ( ) 012 ≥GP  and ( ) 022 ≥GP  by asking 
respondents to the lower (g0) and upper (g1) bounds of the event space outside of 
which they are essentially certain the outcome cannot happen at all. This is 
basically the first question of Exchangeability Game. 
Statement 3. If { }ijG  is a sequence of disjoint sets in SG, then  
 
 
Consider ( )12GP  and ( )22GP , “exchangeability” assumption imposes that 
 
 
Statement 4. ( ) ( )Cijij GPGP −= 1     
Consider ( )12GP  and ( )22GP , “exchangeability” assumption imposes that 
 
( )∑
==
=




 n
i
i
j
n
i
i
j GPGP
11
U
( ) ( ) 5.022122212 =+=






GPGPGGP U
( ) ( ) 5.015.01 2212 −==−= GPGP
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Statement 5. ( ) 0=φP  
See Statement 2. 
Statement 6. For each ,G
i
j SG ∈  then ( ) 10 ≤≤ ijGP   
See Statements 1 and 2. 
Statement 7. If in
i
j GG ⊂ with 0,, ≠∈= kNkjkn , then ( ) ( )inij GPGP ≥            
Consider 14G  and
1
2G , “exchangeability” assumption imposes that 
( ) ( ) 25.05.0 1412 =≥= GPGP  
 
 
 
 
 
 
